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CH/lPTER I

Introduction

"There can hardly he any doubt that if Germany
were to shift the focal point of her strategy
to the Mediterranean, she would have had to
solve this task in a military sense."
Field Marshal
Erich von Manstein

I

German-Spanish relations for the century or more
before 1936 by and large constitute a history of co-opera
tion.

Various German and Spanish governments have stood

side by side against Republican France and Napoleon, and
in 1822 at Verona it was Prussia who helped to CGmmissioa
France to restore Ferdinand VII's power as the Spanish
monarch.

In 1868 Leopold of Hohenzollern's consideration

and refusal of the Spanish crown was a trifling incident
that bore amazing results.

During the Cantonal Wars (1873),

it was Germany that sent the first battleship to crush rebel
Spanish naval vessels, and Bisfflarck himself tried a campaign
to influence public opinion by damning the Carlists and
their methods of warfare.
The first serious German-Spanish dispute in recent
times came in 1885 when Germany occupied some of the Caroline
Islands.

Although the Spanish press boasted of Spanish

-2military might—an army "equal in every respect to Meltke's
1
helmeted legions" —the only result was an attack by an
irate mob on the German embassy in Madrid.

The Germans fin

ally left the Carolines, and amiable relations were restored.
In World War I, the Spanish government, especially
the more conservative element, was not so much pro-German as
anti-French.

But the king and the liberals favored the

Entente, and Spain remained neutral despite the fact that
England held Gibralter, something the Spanish have never for
gotten.

Although German commercial competition with England

for Spanish markets had been welcomed as beneficial to the
country, the pro-Entente feeling was a matter of political
principle because of the liberal types of government in
England and France.

In larger measure, however, the Spanish

point of view was probably due to a certain practical, materi
alistic trait often seen in the Spanish character.

For as

Spaniards have pointed out, it would have been fatal for
Spain to have sided with Germany in World War I, since her
wide separation from the latter, coupled with British naval
supremacy, would have made it unlikely that Germany could
have been of any assistance to Spain.

2

But it was after World War I that the cordial rela
tionship between Spain and Germany grew to its fullest.

In

1

G. P. White, A Century of Spain and Portugal
(London: Methuen, 1909X, p. 321,
p

Charles E. Chapman, A History of Spain (New York:
Macmillan, 1948), p. 514.

-31927-28, the German navy ohtained the blessings of the Span
ish king and his dictatorial prime minister, Primo d© Rivera,
and began in Spain the construction of a U-boat of new design.
The vessel was built according to the specifications of the
German naval ministry, and there were many German technicians
on hand.

This project, of course, was in violation of the

Versailles Treaty.

Completed in 1931, the U-boat was built

in the Eche Varietta shipyard in C^diz and became the pilot
3
model for the U-25 and U-26 class boat.
And it was the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 that set
the tone of German-Spanish relations during the first year
or two of the Second World War.

On July 18, 1936, strong

elements of the Spanish Right rose against the newly founded
republic.

The rebels expected to occupy the whole of Spain,

e*cept perhaps for Barcelona and Madrid, within a few days.
They had at their disposal the greater part of the armed
forces of the country and were backed by a strong political
party and a great part of the Church.
isappointed.

But the rebels were

The country divided itself into twp armed

camps—the Loyalist government in the south and the Nationa
list rebels in the north.

In the bitter fighting that

followed, the German Luftwaffe made possible the first gains

^Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prose
cution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression.
Supp. A (Washington D. C.; United States Government Printing
Office, 1947), p. 977.

-4of the Nationalists by transporting their leader and reserves
over the guns of Loyalist naval forces lying in wait in the
4
Strait of Gibraltar,

After their failure to bring down the

republic with a quick coup« the Spanish Nationalists had
appealed to Berlin to aid their cause just as they had
aided Germany in years past.

Hitler sent the Junkers-52s'

to Spanish Morocco, and gave the rebellion in Spain a new
lease on life.
The first German infantry to arrive in Spain reached
Cadiz on or about November 7, 1936,

General Sperrle, the

commander of the Luftwaffe Condor Legion in Spain, wrote in
Die Wehrmacht of Jlay, 1939, that 6,500 German troops landed
5
in November, 1936.

Before that, about 5,000 other volun

teers of a "non-military" nature had arrived.

Technicians

and artillery were sent to the Nationalists via Portugal,
and in Hamburg there was a dock that became known to the
local citizens as "France wharf,"

6

Although German aid continued throughout most of
the civil war (it was reduced by Berlin in early 1939),
its need was most keenly felt and its arrival most highly
appreciated during those crucial months of the summer and
4
Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (New York;
Macmillan, 1943), p. 316»
5
P, A, M, van der Esch, Prelude to gar (The Hague;
Martinus Nijhoff, 1951), p. 38,
^Ibid.. 36.

-5fall of 1936.

In the middle of November, Hitler sent one

combat group (3 squadrons of Junkers-52), a fighter group
(3 squadrons of Heinkel-5l), a company of radio operators,
a company of telegraphists, a company of "listeners," and
a meteorologist unit, as well as the thousands of infantry
troops mentioned above.

The German Condor Legion (Luft

waffe), commanded at different times by Generals Sperrle,
Volkmann, and von Richthefen, did yeoman service against
the Loyalists.

So proud was Hitler of his forces in Spain

that he had nothing but praise for a German film, completed
at the cost of several million marks, based on the exploits
8
of the famous Condor Legion.
The civil war ended at 10:00 p.m., March 26, 1939.
The rebels had won.

And no mean share of that victory was

due to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

Shortly before, in

February, the Nationalist government had concluded a cultural
agreement (see below) with the Third Reich.^

This, and the

Spanish adhesion to the Anti-Comintern Pact (see below),
were the only two tangible agreements that held Spain in
bond to the Nazis.

The Spaniards chose to ignore the debt

owed the Reich for war aid, and most of the feeling of

Claude G. Bowers,
Mission to Spain (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 259.
^Ibid., 2.60, .
Q
"Resume of the Cultural Agreement Between Germany
and Nationalist (insurgent) Spain," School and Society.
February 4, 1939, p. 150.

-6"fascist brotherhood" existed in the hearts of Hitler and
Mussolini,

General Franco, the new ruler of Spain, was

grateful, but fiercely independent.

His attitude was not

to change, nor to be changed,

II

Gurse Complete de Primera Ense^anza. the standard
elementary school textbook used today throughout Spain,
defines the present Spanish regime as;
The Spanish State, born under the unity and
greatness of the Fatherland, is a totalitarian
instrument at the service of the Fatherland;
National-Syndicalist in character in everything
which signifies a reaction against liberal
capitalism and Marxist materialism.^®
By the end of June, 1940 (after the fall of France), this
"totalitarian instrument" institutionally resembled the Third
Reich.

Much as in the German scheme of things, Franco and the

Spanish government were indistinguishable.

Franco in Spain,

as Hitler in Germany, was Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, Chief of the government, Leader of the only legal
party, and Head of the State.
enjoyed only one dubious right;

His parliament, the Cortes,
the approval of his decrees,

if he submitted them for approval.

Other apparent similari

ties can be noted between the two regimes.

Germany had the

Gestapo, Spain the Falangist Direccion General de Seguridad;
Germany had the SA and the SS, Spain the Militia Armada,
l^Emmet John Hughes, Report From Spain (New York;
Henry Holt, 1947), p. 3.

-7Germany's attitude toward Spain as of the end of June,
1940, was one of benevolence.

The Reich, of course, looked

upon Falangist Spain as a fledgling member of the association
of World Leaders—a member of the New Order.

But more prac

tically, Germany knew that Spain possessed qualities benefi
cial to Germany's war plans.

First of all, Spain's strategic

location was noted by Hitler himself when he observed that
the Luftwaffe's attempt to block the Sicily passage from the
air was but a poor substitute for the possession of Gibraltar,
If Germany could have held the "Rock," she would have been in
a position to gain a foothold in North Africa and to close
11
the western Mediterranean to the British fleet.
The German
navy's interest in Spain stemmed from a desire to have
Atlantic bases farther from the RAF's reach than those at

12
Brest or Cherbourg,
while the Canary Islands were ideal as
bases—both naval and air—for submarine and surface fleets
as well as for the Luftwaffe.
A second practical reason for Germany's interest
was one of population.

The Spanish people numbered over

25,000,000 possible allies, workers, soldiers, and if

^^Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. VI, 442.

12

Generaloberst Franz Haider, The Private War
Journal of Generaloberst Franz Haider (Chief of the General
Staff of the Supreme Command of the German Army. 1939-1942).
(Released by the Office of the Chief Historian, Headquarters
European Command: United States Army, 1950), Vol. V, p. 19,

-8necessary, slaves.

In the third place, the armed forces of

Spain (although not modern) were reasonably large and were
certainly battle trained and tested.

The regular Spanish

army numbered, according to German estimates, 250,000 in
13
peacetime, and 500,000 could be mustered.
held the Spanish soldier in high esteem.

Hitler himself

When speaking of

the troops of the "Blue Division" which fought with the
ffehrmacht on the Eastern Front in 1942-43, he said:
To (German) troops the Spaniards are a crew
of ragamuffins. They regard a rifle as an
instrument that should not be cleaned under
any pretext. Their sentries exist in prin
ciple only. They don't take up their posts,
or if they do take tiiem up, they do so in
their sleep, ihen the Russians arrive, the
natives have to wake them up. But the
Spaniards have never yielded an inch of
ground. One can't imagine more fearless
fellows. They scarcely take cover. They
flout death. I know, in any case, that our
men are always glad to have Spaniards as
neighbors in their sector.
The fall of France gave to Spain yet another quality
in the eyes of the Germans,

Spain possessed coal, iron,

copper, and especially tungsten—and with France occupied,
a direct transportation route to the interior of the fieich
lay waiting and ready.

Germany could make good use of that

tungsten, as well as the other natural resources of Spain.
And lastly, Spain was led by men who were fascists, or at
least appeared to be such in both London and Berlin,

As far

^^Halder, V, 3«.
14
A^olf Hitler, Hitler's Secret Conversations (here
after referred to as The Table Talks},edited by H, R, TrevorRoper (New Yorkr Parrar, Straus and Young, 1953), p. 148,

-9as the Germans were concerned, the bond of "fascist brother
hood," the concept of the New Order, made Spain a partner,
an ally, a comrade in arms.
But the German evaluation of Spain in that summer of
1940 ignored, wholly or in part, certain important factors
that were active upon the Spanish scene.
these was the new ruler of Spain himself.

The greatest among
For with the com

ing of peace in 1939, General Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo
Teodule Franco Bahamonde commanded the Spanish state.

Emmet

John Hughes, in his work Report From Spain, gives an insight
into the character of the Caudillo and his government;
This man is a Gallegan, By tradition these
men of Spain's northwesternmost corner are
striking prototypes of the Latin peasant
character: they are stubborn, they are
shrewd, they are cautious, they are adroit,
they are tenacious. These adjectives not
only apply accurately to the character of
Spain's dictator, but also illustrate the
whole nature and temper of his regime: its
resolute clinging to power, and its sinuous,
elusive capacity to reconcile the most flag
rant contradictions, to rationalize the
grossest inconsistencies,
Spain, according to Hughes, has always been fond of paradox,
and this singular quality is the key to the Franoeo regime
and to the general himself.

The Caudillo lacked the mandate

from the people, he did not possess any such mass personal
following as to support his exercise of power.

In the final

analysis it was dependent upon an alliance of those old.

^^Hughes,

5.

-10historic political forces which have always been on the
Spanish scene—the Church and the army.
After his first chat with Franco in 1942, Carlton
Hayes, the American ambassador, related what had transpired;
What really happened during those fifty
minutes was a spirited conversation between
General Franco and myself, with the Baron de
las Torres interpreting and Sr. Serrano
Suner sitting mute. The General, I soon
perceived, differed notably from the carica
tures of him current in the 'leftist' press
of the United States, Physically he was not
so short or so stout and he did not 'strut,'
Mentally he impressed me as being not at all
a stupid person, but distinctly alert and
possessing a good deal of both determination
and caution and a rather lively and spontaneous
sense of humor,^
Hayes described the general as a professional military man
and held that like so many others of his calling Franco
possessed a limited knowledge of the complexities and
potentialities of the world outside of his own.

Also,

the new ambassador thought he detected a note of admira
tion— or fear—in the general's discussion of the Wehrmacht,
Emmet John Hughes wrote that Franco considered himself
the savior of Spain, the single force that "through God's
17
grace and his own zeal'"
saved Spain in 1936-39 from
Communism and atheism.

Even if this claim be true, it is

undeniable that Franco failed to save Spain from the depths
1 fi
Carlton J. H. Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain,
1942-1946 (New York; Macmillan, 1946), p. 30,
^'''Hughes,

6. ^

-11of economic chaos in 1939-40.

Although the Third lieich

had sent tons of war material and thousands of troops and
planes to aid the Nationalists in the Civil War, Berlin
had failed to deliver any type of aid needed to secure
Spain's prosperity after the war.

Even as the panzer

legions of the Wehrmaeht reached the Pyrenees at the end of
June, 1940, the Spanish people drew ever nearer to starva
tion.

Carlton Hayes noted that by July, 1941, the situation

had grown so desperate that Secretary Hull explained to
President Roosevelt that unless something were done to meet
Spanish fuel requirements a situation would result which
might have conceivably presented the Germans occupying
Prance with an excuse for restoring order in Spain, i.e.,
intervention.

Food distribution within Spain was completely

dependent upon transportation, and transportation upon fuelEven in 1940-41, German-Spanish trade was not in any volume,
nor did it involve those commodities (food and fuel) that
Spain needed so desperately.
Thus, if the Spaniard eared to think like a fascist,
he was inexorably bound to British and American trade;
The Spanish government of General Franco
thoroughly appreciated the country's cardinal
need for petroleum and its dependence upon
the United States for making a supply of
that commodity available to Spain.'

l®Hayes, 80,
^^Ibid,. 82,

-12The Germans failed, in large part, to recognize the dire
economic situation of Spain as of June-July 1940.

They

failed to see that the Spanish were dependent on American
oil.

They did not realize that Spain had to obtain her

20
rubber and wheat from overseas sources.

And Spain her

self continued to be the neutral—to commit herself in no
way.

Although she was economically dependent upon the

democracies, as late as 1943 Spain was shipping some iron
ore to a Germany that could give her none of the vital
commodities she needed so desperately.

General Blumentritt

noted that ''the convoys brought from Spain the raw materials
21
(iron ore) which were lacking at home.'*
Spanish reasons
behind such actions remains hidden in the archives in Madrid,
But the Spanish charade was well played.

After the

victorious German army had reached the Pyrenees over a fallen
France in the early summer of 1940 (June 27), there was every
reason to believe, both in the Allied and Asix worlds, that
Spain would soon take the logical step in her development as
a fascist state, that she would join her victorious sister
states of the New Order in the war of "European unity."

^^Hayes, 79,
21
Guenther B. Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt (London:
Odhams Press Ltd., 1952), p. 152,

-la

in
When France surrendered on June 25, 1940, the German
Reich was at the zenith of its power.

Spain, on the other

hand, was a weak and war ravaged Latin state, with less than
one-third Germany's population and possessing a military force
that could not have hoped to compete with the seemingly allpowerful Wehrmacht.

In comparing German and Spanish military

strength as of that year, one finds that in the West the
Germans possessed a military machine of 165 divisions, with
an airforee of 57 bomber and dive-bomber groups and 41 fighter
groups.

The Wehrmacht had on hand ten armored divisions, and

ten more were being activated.

22

French, Czech, and Polish

arms and armor were available, and food stores, oil reserves,
and ammunition and material depots had been captured.

The

German navy, in that early summer of 1940, held ports
directly on the ocean at Brest, Cherbourg, Le Havre, Antwerp,
Bordeaux, and Rotterdam.

It had also broken British naval

ciphers, which gave its submarine and surface fleets an
advantage above and beyond the new high-seas ports, i.e.,
first hand knowledge of British convoys, their size, cargo,
speed, protection and destination.

23

Besides France, the

Wehrmacht occupied half of Poland, all of Belgium, Holland

"^"^Halder, IV, 82-83.
^^Peter Fleming, Operation Sea Lion (New York;
and Schuster, 1957), p. 190.

Simon

-14Euxembourg, Czechoslovakia and Norway, and was contemplating
the invasion and occupation of the British Isles.
In comparison with their own strength, German esti
mates of Spanish and Portugese military potential are
instructive.

On November 13, 1940, General Haider noted in

his War Journal the following report;:
Spain: Army; 27 divisions of 9,000 peacetime
strength, each. War strength of army 500,000;
armament on hand. Lacking AAA (antiaircraft
artillery). Armor consists of a great variety
of models, as does aviation. Armanents Industry;
meets only peacetime requirements. Coastal
artillery; ammunition stocks very low. Officers
Corps; severly depleted, 50% were massacred.
Morocco; border has only field fortifications,
Ceuta obsolete harbor fortifications— 2-3
24cm. batteries. Seven divisions (including
five crack divisions) with full complement
of divisional artillery regements, plus three
corps of artillery of six battalions (10 5 cm.
and 15.5cm.)«
Tangier; open roadstead. Can
ary Islands; little is known about artillery
defences. No air fnrce^ Rio do Ore; only a
weak police force.
On the same day Haider received a report on the other
Iberian state, Portugal, which would ultimately be greatly
affected by any Spanish military or political action.
Haider noted it thus-.:
Portugal; Army; five weak divisions in the home
country. Azores; 3 (infantry)-0 (cavalry)-3
Artillery) and a few 15cm. guns, Madeira; one
battalion, one btry. Cape Verde Islands; one
company (completely insufficient). Kaper
strength of war-time army is 100,000. Time
needed for mobilization cannot be estimated.
Army deliberately neglected. Coastline; the
army Is not in a position to defend the home

^^alder, V, 19

-15eountry, the islands and the colonies. Inten
tion to defend them against Britain is at
least doubtful, Porto and Lisbon are forti
fied. Obsolete installations, projected
modernization has not been carried out. No
officers corps in our sense of the word.
Officers have part time civilian jobs. Arma
ment being modernized, but process interrupted
by war. Armament industry practically nonexistant
Spanish arms, and more important Spain herself, would
have benefited the German war machine, but obviously presented
no danger to the Reich in terms of military prowess or
ability as of 1940,

Spain was both militarily inferior

to Germany and politically associated, at least in spirit,
with the Axis.

The Reich's superiority in terms of men and

material, and in terms of military ability, was a fact.

If

Germany cared to force Spain to make a choice, le., alliance
or occupation, Spain could have expected no aid from allies,
for she had none, save the Axis themselves and perhaps Fortugal, who might or might not have conceded a "common Iberian
interest."
alone.

In 1940, Spain stood with the Axis, or she stood

The Spanish government, whatever its reasons, stood

with the Axis.

The next step was for Germany and Italy to

persuade Spain to march with them.
In the summer and early autumn of 1940, the German
government attempted to gain two ends in Spainr

first,

Inducing Spain to join the Tri-partite Axis alliance in

^^Halder, V, 19.

-16the interest of the solidarity of the New Order, and second,
persuading Spain to become a belligerent, primarily in terms
of a combined German-Spanish assault on Gibraltar.
first goal was all but achieved in 1940.

The

Although Spain had

not yet become a member of the Axis alliance, Franco had
joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939, and his intentions,
as far as the Germans were concerned, were what they should
have been, i.e., tending toward the Axis alliance.

As John

Hughes points out:
At Burgos, on March 27, 1939, Spain had joined
the Anti-Comintern Pact, the protocol of
accession going into effect at once:
and the
German delegate von Stohrer, the Italian
Gampalti, and the Japanese Makoto Yano felt
that they could count on Spain in the days
to Gome.^°
And Spain did not lag, not yet.
In early 1940, the German ambassador in Madrid, von
Stohrer, was able to cable Berlin that the Spanish govern
ment was prepared to place German tankers in out-of-the-way
bays of the Spanish coast, ready them, and even aid in ser
vicing them.

These tankers were to be used in fueling German

27
vessels on the high seas.

Von Stohrer also stated that

"the Spanish government has already shown a similar obliging28
ness in supplying German U-boats."
In 1940, after the fall
of France, Spain occupied Tangier and permitted the Reich to

26

Hughes, 232,

27

Ibid,, 237.
Ibid.

-17open a consulate which served as a key center for Nazi
espionage activities throughout all North Africa.

29

Franco

and his government were careful to abide, by and large, with
the provisions of the Cultural
1939.

Agreement of January 28,

Under it Spain and Nazi Germany were to have spiritual

and cultural co-operation, and the agreement provided for
the exchange of professors, students, books, the opening of
schools, the arrangements of expositions, currency facilities
in each other's country, privileged positions for the language
of each country in the school curriculum of the other, musical
and theatrical exchanges, motion picture co-operation, and
all the other media by which Falangist Spain would be drawn
nearer to the leader of the New Order—Germany.
But the test of Spanish sincerity was yet to come.
By the fall (October) of 1940, the Germans seemed willing
to allow Spain to join the Axis in victory, to enter the
war on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact alone.

In the

fall and winter of that year there were other, more impor
tant matters to be considered than the Axis Pact and Spain's
legal entry to it.

Among these greater matters were (1) the

defeat and occupation of the British Isles, and (2) the
capture of the last remaining piece of continental soil
still in British hands—Gibraltar, gateway to the

^%ughes, 237.

-18-

Mediterranean.

Once the Spaniards actively engaged in a

combined assault on the "Rock," the die would be cast.
Spain ^would be in the war,

IV

Franco had assured Hitler on June 3 that he looked
upon the war as his own struggle, and that he rejoiced over
30
recent German victories.

He had concluded with an apolo

getic phrase, explaining that he could not enter the war
because Spain suffered from a weak economic system, one that
could not stand the strain of anything but neutrality.

This

attitude on the part of Madrid had been quickly countered by
a communique from the German foreign office, dated June 17,
1940.
The attention of the Spanish government should
be drawn to the impending collapse of France
and its effect on German-Spanish relations.
It is assumed that Spain has discontinued
delivery of strategic materials to the Allies.
Hitler was certain that Franco would, as the Fuehrer
put it, "come into the game,"

32

On July 13, he told Haider

that Spain was to be drawn into the war and thus to serve as
a vital part in the front the Fuehrer envisaged from the North
30
United States Department of State, Documents on
German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945 (Washington D. C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1957), IX, 509,
^^Ibid.. 605.
32

Haider, IV, 116.

-1933
Cape in Noi*way to Spanish Morocco,

Haider learned that the

Nazi foreign minister, von Ribhentrop, had that same day been
ordered to go to Spain to get the foundation of the GermanSpanish undertaking well in place.
Von Ribbentrop found conditions in the Iberian penin
sula not what he had expected.

The civil war had caused

tremendous destruction in Spain, and World War II tended to
hurt rather than aid her faltering economy.

On May 10, he

had curtly advised the Spanish government that her economy
had to be built '*from within," not "from without" by means
34
of foreign (Allied) credits.
His visit during the middle
of July illustrated beyond all doubt the fact that he had
been too hasty, and that Spain was truly in dire economic
straits.

This revelation of their potential ally's weak

ness did not dampen the Germans' spirits, however.
So confident were the leaders in Berlin that Spain
would come "into the game" that Haider wrote on July 22 that
an alliance between Spain and Portugal (which was rumored to
be in the making) was agreeable to Germany—providing that
35
Portugal sever her ancient relationship with Great Britain.
And so important was Gibraltar that he wrote on July 30 that

Haider, IV, 116.
S. Dept. of State, Documents on German Foreign
Policy, IX, 318.
35

Haider, IV, 129.

if Germany decided she could not successfully invade the
British Isles that fall, then the attack on Gibraltar from
the landside would be an alternative line of action, along
with possible movements into Turkey or against Suez,

36

But almost as soon as General Franco learned that
something more than cultural agreements and statements of
"fascist unity" was expected, he began to vacillate in his
fervor for the Axis cause.

Lt. Col, Hauck reported to

Haider on August 9 the pessimistic findings of Admiral
Canaris, Chief of the German Abwehrt.
Spain will not do anything against Gibraltar
on her own accord. German intelligence reports
to date. Drawing of Spain into (the) war will
be difficult. Economic problems.
But on August 23 Haider received a report from von Etzdorf,
the military attach^ in Madrid.

It was of quite a different

hue:
Spain is willing to enter the war on our side.
Wants 700,000 tons of grain, in return, (Wants)
disarmament of North Africa (Vichy-Prench),
Post War claims: Gibraltar, Morocco, and
Algeria as far as Oran,^®
Haider wrote directly below this entry, "Spain wants North
west Africa."
Sometime in late August, 1940, the Germans began to
gain a better appreciation of the true picture.

^®Halder, IV, 140,
^"^Ibid,. 154.
^^Ibid,. 170.

In his

-21somber report to Haider on August 27, Canaris pointed out
that all was not what it seemed:
Gibraltar; Franco's policy from the start
was not to come in until Britain was defeated,
for he is afraid of her might (ports, food
situation, etc.). Now the Fuehrer is working
on him to swing him over to our side. Suner
is supposed to come here. Spain has very bad
internal situation. They are short on food
and have no coal. The generals and the clergy
are against Franco. His only support is Suner,
who is more pro-I^alian than pro-German
The consequences of having this unpredictable
nation as a partner cannot be calculated. We
shall get an ally who will cost us dearly.
Nowhere in Canaris' report can one find a cheerful note.
Compare it, however, to the report Haider received from
Bruns, another military attach^ in Madrid, on September 4,
only ten days latere
Franco still firmly in (the) saddle, supported
by armed forces. General Vigon (Air minister
and army chief-of-staff) friend of Germany.
Internal tensions to be overcome by common
effort at Gibraltar. (Gibraltar is conceived
as an all-Spanish effort. a national goal,
unitTng all political factions.> Z^talics min^
...Danger from Suner. Reconstruction of troop
officers corps will take two to three years.
Staff officers—good. Spain can furnish 350 400,000 men, without equipment. Has 60,000
white soldiers and 20,000 Moors in North Africa.
Portugal: Spain wants to prevail on Portugal
to permit entry of Spanish troops in event of
invasion of Portugal by foreign power (England).
Financial^, Portugal is not tied to any foreign
power, /italics min^.

^^Halder, IV, 175.
^Olbid,, 183,

-22Neither the Fuehrer nor the Wehrmacht were pleased
with these contradictory reports from the various intelli
gence sources in Spain.

In order to settle the matter of

Spain's role in the war. Hitler on September 14 called a
eonference during which he impatiently reminded the military
that a long war was undesirable for Germany,

He declared

that the war could be brought to a close most swiftly by
an invasion of the British Isles.

That being immediately

impossible because of failure to gain control of the air
and bad flying weather (sic), Gibraltar had to be taken,
Haider noted, regarding the Fuehrer Conference: "Gibraltar;
no definite orders.

Merely expression of intention to

promise Spaniards everything they want, regardless of
42
whether the promises can be kept.

The most fantastic

concessions were to be offered to Spain.

She was to control

West Africa as far down as twenty degrees south latitude,
and even be granted southward expansion of the Spanish
Cameroons (Rio Muni),
On September 23, Hitler wrote Franco with the object
43
of "enlisting his participation in the attack on Gibraltar,"
and on October 7, Haider noted that the Duce was to draw
44
Spain into the Axis,
41
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And on October 8:

"There are to be

-23negotiations with Spain on a new basis."

45

By October 15,

Hitler was no longer vague in regard to his desire for
Gibraltar.

Haider wrote, between quotation marks, the
46
words of his Fuehrer: "'Gibraltar must be takenl'"
On
that same day, Hitler met and talked with Serrano Suner, the
Spanish foreign minister, regarding German-Spanish co-opera
tion vis-a-vis Gibraltar, but S^ner refused to commit himself
to anything until definite colonial and economic matters
were settled.

When Hitler countered with the question of

payment of Spain's civil war debt, Suner's answer was: "Such
mingling of idealism with materialism is incomprehensible
47
for a Spaniard."
Hitler is said to have felt "like a little
Jew."

Toward the end of his entries for October 15, Haider

noted that the Fuehrer was writing a letter to Franco.

The

Spanish olaim to Oran was Just too much for Hitler to
swallow, and "the Fuehrer is going to have a meeting with
48
Franco on the French-Spanish frontier."
Evidently Hitler
thought he could get further with Franco than with the
haughty, austere Suner,
The conference took place on October 23, 1940, in
the little French town of Hendaye, which rests at the foot

"^^alder, IV, 225.
"ibid., 233.
^'^Ibid.
48
Ibid.. 235.

of the Pyrenees.
are sparse.

The meeting was secret, and accounts of it

The only important available source is a German

memorandum of the conversation between the two dictators.
After greeting his guest. Hitler told Franco that he
was very happy to meet the Caudillo personally, especially
since he had been with him in spirit during the civil war.
The Fuehrer then informed the Caudillo that the war was over
and that Britain would soon capitulate.

He (Hitler) had re

organized the Wehrmacht so that:
Beginning in March of the following year (1941),
the army would present itself in the following
strength:
of a total of 230 divisions, 186 were
attack divisions. The rest consisted of defense
and occupation troops. Of 186 attack divisions,
20 were armored divisions equipped with German
material, while 4 " "' '
"
'' ' ides
possessed captured
In
addition to this there were 12 motorized divi
sions. With this array strength Germany was
grown ready for any eventuality.
Hitler told the Caudillo that Britain now knew that the war
was lost; in any event she would be crushed and not even her
hope in the USSR could save her.

As for the United States,

there was no need for alarm for there would be no change in
the status quo, at least not for a considerable time.

"Until

America's military power (will) be fully armed," said Hitler,
/
V
50
"at least two to four years (will) pass."
49

But then the

James W. Gantenbein (ed.). Documentary Background
of World War II, 1931-1941 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1948), p. 727,
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-25Fuehrer informed Franco that a considerable danger for Spain
would result should the United States entrench herself on the
Islands lying off Africa in the Atlantic Ocean, or should
Great Britain do the same.

The danger was great because no

one could be certain of the loyalty of the French troops
I

stationed in North Africa to Petain^
The greatest threat existing at the moment
was that a part of the Colonial Empire would,
with abundant material and military resources,
desert France and go over to De Gualle,
England, or the United States.^^
Hitler easily explained away the recent failure of
the Wehrmacht to invade and occupy the British Isles.

It

had been the weather that had held up the invasion (sic).
Since the middle of August, there had not been five fair days,
and a major attack against the British naval forces by the
Luftwaffe supposed favorable atmospheric conditions.
the "cancellation" of the invasion.

Hence,

The Fuehrer went on to

describe the state of affairs in which Germany found herself.
According to Hitler, victory lay at his finger tipst
In the meantime, England, and especially London,
was being bombarded day and night. On London
alone, 3,500,000 kilograms of bombs had been
dropped. Many harbor installations, factories,
and armament works were thus being shattered;
England's approaches were being mined; and an
increasing U-boat activity was contributing to
the further isolation of the Islands. At the
moment, the number of U-boats being finished
every month was 10. In spring, it would rise
to 17; in July to 25, and after that up to 34
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-26per month*...the concentrated activity of the
air-arm, mine-layers, destroyers, and speed
boats would do so much damage and harm to
England that in the end attrition would set
in.
The Hendaye meeting ended with what might be construed
as the Fuehrer's final argument in his attempt to win over
the Caudillo to the Axis war effort.

While German air and

naval forces besieged the British on the sea and over the
Home Islands, Hitler's troops in France and the Lowlands
would be used to crush England's last hold on the ContinentGibraltar.

The combined German-Spanish assault would be

crowned with victory, a victory that would be but one among
many.

Diplomatic victories had been won by Germany, and in

his appeal the Fuehrer backed up his plan for the combined
assault on Gibraltar by painting for Franco a striking
picture of Axis solidarity, strength, and inevitable
victory;.
Naturally, Germany has an interest in ending
the war in a short time if possible, since
every additional month costs money and sacri
fice. In the attempt to bring about the end
of the war as soon as possible and to render
the entry of the United States into the war
more difficult, Germany has concluded the
Tripartite Pact. This Pact is compelling
the United States to keep its Navy in the
Pacific Ocean and to prepare herself for a
Japanese attack from that direction. In
Europe as well, Germany is attempting to
expand her base. He (Hitler) could
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-27confidentially report that several other
nations had announced their intention of
joining the Tripartite Bact.^^
And Spain should now join the winning side I
During the day-long conference the Caudillo was
affable, dignified, and uncowed.
detached.

At moments he even seemed

When he finally mounted his own railway coach to

again cross the Bidossoa and return to Spain, he was fending
off an insistent Fuehrer's
"I must have your answer now,"
Answered the Caudillo;
"I will think about it."

"I will write to you.'*^'^

After the Hendaye conference there was correspondence
between the two dictators and much going to and fro of minis
ters and generals.

But Franco never got around to committing

himself one way or another.

He never specifically agreed to

join the Three Power Pact, and he never allowed Spain to
become a declared belligerent.

He simply did—nothing.

Typical of the correspondence was an exchange in February,
1941,

Hitler addressed the usual pleas to the Caudillo

on February 6, 1941 (after the date set for the GermanSpanish attack on Gibralter had come and passed).

Franco

left Hitler's letter unanswered until February 26, when he

^^Gantenbein, 729.
Ian Colvin, Chief of Intelligence (Londonr Victor
Gollancz, 1951), p, 129.

-28replied:

"Your letter of the 6 makes me wish to reply very

promptly..

V

On November 1, 1940, Haider noted in his War Journal
that the Fuehrer was very displeased with the results of the
Hendaye conference.

He had spent an entire day with Franco

and had received in return nothing more tangible than state
ments about Axis "spiritual solidarity."

Hitler did not enjoy

being ignored by Franco, nor having his demands ignored.
Franco indisputably left Hendaye the diplomatic victor.

But
He

had stalled the German drive, at least for a little while, to
push or drag—or both—Spain into the war.

Haider noted be

tween quotation marks the words of his Fuehrer regarding General
Franco:

"'Jesuit Swine'" and "'misplaced Spanish pride.
When Hitler had recovered from his herculean effort

at Hendaye ("I would rather have four teeth pulled than go
through it again" he told Mussolini in Florence),

57

he

optimistically set about organizing the means, both political
and military, necessary for an assault on Gibraltar.

After

all, the Caudillo had not refused to co-operate, and these
"outline plans" (as they were called) existed for every
FC C
Colvin, 129.
^®Halder, V, 3.
^"^Colvin, 131.

-29contingency, although they would not be put into detailed
preparations until the political omens were favorable.
Hitler and his Wehrmaeht were not prone to overlook possible,
and in this case highly probable, developments.
November 12, 1940, the "Fuehrer and

Thus, on

Supreme Commander of

the Armed Forces (Wehrmaeht) issued Directive No, 18;
Directive No. 18: Preparatory measures for the
conduct of the war in the near future will be
taken by the High Commands along the following
1 ine s:
1, Relations with France
2. Spain and Portugal:
Political steps have been taken to
bring an early entry of Spain into the
war. The object of the German inter
vention in the Iberian Peninsula (code
name, FELIX) will be to drive the
British from the western Mediterranean,
To this effect:
a. Gibraltar must be seized and
the Straits closed,
b. The British must be prevented
from establishing themselves
on another spot in the Iberian
Peninsula or^the Atlantic
Islands...
The orders for the preparation and execution of
Operation Felix were laid down by the Fuehrer as follows:
there were to be four phases to the action, the reconnais
sance phase, the air attack phase, the land attack phase,
and the occupation phase.

In the first, the reconnaissance

phase, teams of German officers dressed in civilian clothes
were to go into Spain and arrange for the transport of troops
and supplies through the Iberian peninsula to points of
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-30concentration for the attack.

These "teams" were also to

secure landing fields for the Luftwaffe's air attacks on
the "Rock" and British ships in the harbor.
In the air attack phase, Luftwaffe planes were to
carry out a surprise attack from French airfields on the
gun galleries in the "Rock" and against anti-aircraft and
coastal batteries around Gibraltar.
attack any shipping in the harbor.

They were also to
Next, of course, the

German (and perhaps some Spanish) troops were to pour across
the small, sandy isthmus connecting the "Rock " with the
Spanish mainland.
Gibraltar.

The troops were to capture and occupy

Additional Wehrmacht troops already in Spain

were to be prepared to enter Portugal should the British
attempt a landing there.

These reserve troops were also to

ucick up the attack on Gibraltar and in general to maintain
order and to oppose an enemy landing anywhere on the Iberian
peninsula.
In the final phase, German forces were to aid the
Spaniards (if necessary) in closing the Straits.

Some units

were to go to Morocco with coastal artillery, while others
were to utilize Gibraltar.

With the Luftwaffe occupying

Spanish airfields and patroling the air over the Strait,
with German coastal artillery on both sides of it, and with
the German navy having mined it, the Strait of Gibraltar
would be closed.

-SiHitler next concerned himself in Directive No. 18
with the Atlantic Islands.
was laid down.

But no definite plan of attack

The commanders-in-chief of the three

services were simply to examine the problem of taking the
Atlantic Islands, as well as Madeira and the Azores, and
report to the Fuehrer with their findings.

With respect

to Italy, Hitler simply stated that no Italian participa
tion was foreseen.
With the passing of the autumn of 1940, Operation
Felix became ever more complex and detailed.

Haider made

note of the fact that reconnaissance parties were being
readied in Bordeaux.

One of their duties, incidentally,

was to ascertain the feasibility of introducing menthane
gas into the galleries of the Gibraltar "Bock."

Once

introduced, the gas would be ignited and the galleries
59
and gun positions demolished.

The artillery and intel

ligence sections made their reports, stating that prepara
tions were progressing.

By November 4, 1940, Haider was

able to identify the units scheduled to take part in the
action:
Against Portugal;
Corps Schmidt, consisting
of Fourth Armored Division and SS Deathhead
Division. Over Schmidt and Kuebler (the
commander of the SS Deathhead Division) will
be Command Staff Reichenau.

^^Halder, V, 1.
®°Ibid., 7.

-32On that same day, Haider observed the readiness of the coastal
artillery to he used in closing the Straits, as well as for
bombarding Gibraltar:
Artillery: captured enemy (British) guns with
personnel batteries from 13th Draft for Spanish
and North African (Spanish Moroccan) coast.
Spain: get ready 15cm. and 10cm. guns; initially
we may also lend some mobile batteries, Islands^j^
(will need) some captured enemy guns with crews.
In the same entry he mentioned that he and the Commander-inChief of the Army had discussed methods for crossing the
Strait of Gibraltar to Spanish Morocco.

By November 5 (seven

days before the formal issuance of Directive No. 18) Haider
noted that preparations were coming along so well that any
lagging was noticeable.
units for Portugal:

For example:

"Readying of Armored

Sixteenth Armored Division, Sixteenth

Motorized Division not ready yet—investigate."
and large deadlines were met.
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But by

By November 20, the Twenty-

Second Division was fit for operations (reserve), and general
furlough restrictions were imposed in the units earmarked for
63
Gibraltar,

Haider recorded that Reichenau was appointed

commander of the operation, over the protesxs of Goering who
wanted von Richthofen (former commander of the Condor Legion)
and the Luftwaffe to have full control.

Within eight days

(November 14) Haider wrote that the Luftwaffe had declined

®^Halder, V, 7,
®^Ibid., 9.
63
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-33the envisaged mission against the Cape Verde Islands, Canary
Islands, and the Azores.

This, noted Haider, was Goering's

doing; Hitler had turned down Goering's demand that von Richthofen be given full control of the Spanish operation, and
Goering had pouted and offered excuses for the inability of
64
the Luftwaffe to carry out the operation against the Islands.
By November 11, the day before the general formal order con
tained in Directive No. 18 was issued, Haider noted that the
OKW had been notified that three weeks alert notice would be
needed to make sure of the proper movement and dispersion of
troops and materiel.

Preparations, although not highly

advanced, were at least existent.
The success of Operation Felix depended on that
element of synchronization that so worried Haider.

There

were numerous entries about shipping being late, or the
airforce not knowing what to do when it had to do it, or the
65
lack of coastal artillery
that would prevent the defense
of the right place at the right time.

Most of the entries,

after November 12, dealt with shortages.

There were not

enough flat-bed trailers; the signal communications units
were non-existent; coastal artillery was lacking.

Perhaps

one of the biggest concerns Haider had at that time was the
Irun bridge.

On November 25, he wrote that no decision had

®^Halder, V, 21.
^^Ibid., 48.

-34yet been taken by the High Command (OKH) regarding this weak
but vital bridge.

It would have to be strengthened to sus

tain heavy military rail transport into Spain, but any work
of that nature would have been immediately and correctly
interpreted by British agents.

It therefore had to be put

off until the last moment before the movement of troops up
to the Pyrenees,®^
The Fuehrer himself laid down some of the tactics to
be used in the assault on Gibraltar,

Every inch of the Eng

lish territory was to be pulverized by Spanish-manned German
guns.

To accomplish this tremendous taskj great quantities

of siege gun ammunition were needed, and there was to be
"unlimited expenditure" of it.

Twenty to thirty ammunition

trains were to go through France, or by sea to Malaga.
coastal artillery, said

The

r, had to be there in time

to prevent the escape of unsunk British ships from the devas
tated harbor.

The attacking infantry forces were to make use

of the heaviest tanks, each carrying 27 rounds of ammunition.
General Haider noted the additional plan to blind the anti
aircraft artillery and fire control centers of ihe British

68

by smoke bombs and heavy artillery shells.

These latter

tactics were evidently the innovations of the planning staff.

®%alder, V, 36,
^^Ibld,. 55,
®®Ibid., 11.

In regard to the Spanish and perhaps the Portugese Islands,
since the air force had refused the task of taking them the
navy was to investigate that phase of the operation and plan
69
accordingly.
But by December, 1940, only the most foolishly opti
mistic of the German leaders still believed that the GermanSpanish assault on Gibraltar would ever take place.

Yet, in

the "Fuehrer Conference" of December 5, Hitler made known
that he still wanted Gibraltar.

Operation Felix was to take

place as soon as possible—for Spain would surely resolve her
doubts and take that step which would bring her into the war.
The latest date, said Hitler, for "F" day was to be January
10, 1941.

Hitler reminded the officers present that he

wanted the shortest possible interval between the first air
attack and the start of the heavy artillery bombardsient«

The

70
decision to carry out Felix, said Hitler, was final.
The decision to put Operation Felix into effect may
have been final in Berlin, but in Madrid the thinking was
quite different.

The Hendaye conference had solved nothing.

On November 25, Haider noted that the Spanish question did
not "seem to be getting anywhere.^

71

And indeed it was not.

As Haider himself stated "Spain is riot going to be dragged
AO
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-36into war.

They know that they would have to pay the piper

72
even after German victories."

On November 26 he noted

that the Hendaye-Irun bridge was under "friendly eonsideration" by the Madrid foreign office,

73

but the consideration

was so "friendly" that absolutely nothing was ever done.
And on December 3, two days before the Fuehrer Conference,
Haider noted that Franco was more unpredictable than ever
and that he had set no date for his entry into the war.
Haider recounted the Gaudillo's own excuse:
preparations cannot yet be predicted,"

"Completion of

74

The day before (December 2) Haider noted that Spain
had said that two months were too short to complete prepara75
tions and that Franco could accept no deadline.

Six days

later (December 8), the Caudillo told Admiral Canaris point
blank that entry into the war by the time proposed by Hitler
(January 10, 1941) was impossible, since no preparations had
been made.

The reasons, said Canaris, were mainly of an

economic nature; food, fuel, etc.
problem defied solution.

The Spanish transportation

Finally, the Canary's and the other

Spanish overseas possessions would be lost, and the Portugese
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-37Islands would be occupied by

the enemy. The Islanders, said
76
Canaris, "would simply starve to death,"
Even Hitler was becoming convinced of Spanish hesi
tancy, and on December 9 (a short four days after his "fullspeed-ahead" Fuehrer Conference), Hitler told Haider that
77
he now realized that "Spain has finally declined."
On the
12 of December, Haider made one short entry in his ffar
Journal;

78
"Operation Felix cancelled."

VI

Spain's failure to live up to Axis expectations is
now a matter of history.
game."

Franco did not "come into the

The reasons are many, some of them obvious, and some

undoubtedly hidden. The full explanation will only be known
when ths Spanish government opens its archives.

Until that

time we can only ponder the different and varied facets of
the Spanish paradox.
There is, however, another question—more intriguing
and of more Importance—that complicates the problem.

When

the Reich realized that Spain would not commit herself to war
nor allow her territory to be crossed for a belligerent
purpose, why did not Germany violate Spanish neutrality even
if it meant war with Spain?

"^^Halder, V, 60.
^^Ibid.. 62.
"^^Ibid., 67.

-38The advantages offered

hy such a move were obvious,

and many have already been mentioned.

The capture of

Gibraltar and Ceuta would have been, of course, the primary
benefit, since the possession of the "two pillars of Hercules"
would have made the western Mediterranean an Axis lake and
given the Germans and Italians a land route and a defensible
sea route to North Africa.

An occupied Spain would have

provided naval bases and submarine pen sites on the Bay of
Biscay, the Atlantic, and in the Balearic Islands.

Perma

nent air bases in Spain would have placed the Luftwaffe
within range of North Africa, the middle Atlantic, at least
half of the Mediterranean, and almost all of southwest
Europe.

Military formations in depth would have been in a

position to move northward against the southern flank of
an enemy beachhead on the French or Spanish Biscay coast or
in the south of Prance.

The Canary Islands held out the

promise of overseas naval and air bases, extending greatly
the effective striking distance of the German navy and the
Luftwaffe, and offering greater control of the south and
middle Atlantic.
Spanish population resources would have been at the
command of the German war effort and if necessary transported
to Germany.

Spanish iron, copper, coal, and tungsten would

also have benefited the German war effort.

The gains that

would have accrued from an Axis occupation of Spanish North
Africa were obvious.

With their western entry closed, the

-39British would have had to move troops and supplies through
a U-boat infested south Atlantic to the Suez Canal, which
itself would have been in mortal danger as the Italians to
the south (in Somaliland) and the west (in Libya) drove
against a now almost isolated British outpost.

"How well

Rommel might have fared if the Straits of Gibraltar had been
closed by German siege guns and Stukas in 19411"
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With the

Gibraltar entry closed, the British invasion and supply route
would have been almost completely blocked, thereby strength
ening that "soft under-belly" of Europe shortly to be almost
entirely in Axis hands.

The only way in which the Allies

could have mounted an attack against any part of Mediter
ranean Europe would have been to come through the Suez
Canal—if it were still openl
Finally, the capturc of Gibraltar and the occupation
of Spain would have helped lay the foundation for the "grand
strategy" of Goering and Raeder.

The Chief of the Luftwaffe

and the Commander of the Kriegsmarine (navy) seldom saw eye
to eye.

But at least on this one point they did agree.

Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff of the British Army (1939-1943), discussed the "grand
strategy" in his work Turn of the Tide.

He wrote that both

Goering and Raeder tried to influence Hitler into joining
Italy in an attack on Britain's weakly held bases in the
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-40Mediterranean and Near East, in capturing tlie Suez Canal and
the Persian oil fields, and, in cutting the last link of the
Balkan states and Turkey with the West, either forcing them
to throw in their lot with the Axis or using them as invol
untary corridors through which to encircle the Black Sea,
establishing air bases within striking distance of the
Caucasion oil wells at Baku, and outflanking Russia from
the south.

Goering and Raeder suggested that one German

army group, under von Rundstedt, advance through Spain to
occupy Gibraltar, Algeria, and Tunisia, another under von
Bock through Italy and Tripolitania to conquer Egypt, and a
third under von List through Yugoslavia and Greece to the
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Bosphorus and Anatolia.

Lord Alanbrooke holds that it was precisely this
strategy that those responsible for Britain's safety most
feared.

And, despite their inadequate armaments, the British

had taken immense risks to prevent it.

While with what might

be called her left arm Britain guarded her home seas and
skies, with the other she had to defend tbe Atlantic waters,
the Strait of Gibraltar, the Egyptian desert, the eastern
Mediterranean and the Near East.
despite their domination of

So long as she did so,

Europe, Hitler and Mussolini

QQ
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could not conquer the world.

Short of defeating Britain by

invasion or else attacking Russia, the Germans had to break
that out-stretched arm before they could overrun Asia and
Africa.
Yet in the winter of 1940-41 this did not seem
difficult.

Britain's military power was dangerously weak

and extended, and the striking power of Germany and Italy
appeared to be almost invincibly strong.

There were only

four British battleships in the eastern Mediterranean and
two in the western, based on Alexandria and Gibraltar, and
some fifty-five thousand British, Indian, and Commonwealth
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troops and two hundred air craft in the Nile Valley.

This force was all that stood between the Axis and its goal,
i.e., domination of the Mediterranean area and North Africa.
And not only was Italy^ with her dominating strategic posi
tion and African bastions (Italy had 415,000 troops in

82
Africa alone)

in an ideal position to isolate and destroy

these inadequate British forces, but the German army, which
had overwhelmed Prance, was free to drive through Spain to
Gibraltar, seal off the Mediterranean from the west, and
pour into French North Africa.

The question is:

why did

the Wehrmacht fail to do so?
The Wehrmacht, in 1940-41, possessed plans that could
have affected just such an occupation of Spain and Gibraltar,
Q1
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-42In 1940 Berlin had become concerned over the possibilities
of Allied action against Axis-held Europe via an invasion
of Spain and/or Portugal and a subsequent drive into France.
Blumentritt wrote;

"On the Pyrenees the Spaniards presented

no danger, but rumors were spread that the Allies might also
83
land on the Iberian Peninsula."

On April 30, 1941, Haider

wrote that the Fuehrer ordered an investigation and appraisal
of British possibilities for landings in Portugal, Spain, or
84
Spanish Morocco.

With the coming of May and the Balkan

War, the Wehrmacht began to plan in earnest for a move into
Spain—but only in case of a British landing.

On May 2,

Haider received a report from Heusinger in which was detailed
military-political data of an operation against Spain and
Portugal, and on May 3 he noted that a supply base for pos
sible action on the Iberian peninsula was being readied at
85
Bordeaux.
And on the next day he mentioned a directive
from Berlin on "preparations for a military operation on the
Iberian peninsula in the event of British moves against

86

Portugal, Spain, or Spanish Morocco."
the new plan was "Isabella,"

The code name of

It is important to note that

Haider called it a code name for "defensive measures against
83

Blumentritt, 144.

84
Haider, VI, 91.
®^Ibid., 93.
^^Ibid.. 97.
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a possible Allied invasion of Spain,"

No German invasion

of Spain was being planned with the sole object of occupying
Spain,
Throughout the rest of May, 1941, Haider made note
of the preparations for Isabella.

He wrote that the Irun

bridge had to be restored, replacement units called up,
88
and the troops equipped in case of combat.
Most of the
troops in France were by then merely occupation troops, and
did not possess the necessary equipment to wage a full scale
campaign against British invaders.

Also, the Balkan war and

the buildup for the Eastern offensive had drained off men
and supplies.
The War Journal entry for May 27 holds the first clue
as to the real significance of Operation Isabella.

On that

day Haider wrote of Spanish military ability, not as against
the German Wehrmacht, but rather as against the British army.
The Germans still thought of Spain as a quasi-ally, not as
a potential enemy;
Spain: mobilization takes 8 days. Alert period
for march readiness 12 hours. Ammunition for
one to three months (varying different weapons);
tight on AA (anti-aircraft) ammunition. Fuel
supplies for 2 months. Fighting quality of
Spanish troops against British supposed to be
good. /Ttalics mine/®®
General Haider reported to the Fuehrer at the latter's head87
Haider, VI, 101.
®®Ibid., 104, 122, 125.
89 -r,
-.0 =
Ibid,. 135,

-44quarters on July 6, and found that Hitler envisaged an opera
tion in Spain or Portugal against the threat of British
landings there.

Hitler maintained that at least four

divisions—armored divisions at that—would have to go to
France to be in readiness for the expected landings.

These

divisions would have to come from the Hussian front, but the
Fuehrer held that at least one of them would have to go to
France soon.

This, said Hitler, would bolster German pres

tige and show the world that Germany still had forces
available over and above what was needed on the Russian
90
front.
Thus, the German Wehrmacht switched its program from
one of German-Spanish co-operation to one of German protec
tion of Spain.

The fact is. Hitler was willing to send

sorely needed troops and supplies to Spain to protect her
from the British even after Spain had reneged on her promises
(by deed if not by word) to stand with the New Order.

The

Germans still looked upon Spain as a sister fascist state,
as a member of the New Order.
In 1942, the Isabella plan was dropped, or rather
modified and renamed Ilona.

In contrast to Isabella, Ilona

provided that the ports of Bilbao and Santander were to be
seized to forestall the British, and German troops were to
move to the Spanish-Portugese border, but not over it as

^^Halder, VI, 213,
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under Operation Isabella.
these operations.

Army Group "D" was to effect

There was at that time (1941-42) only a

Military Command France, since France was not an active
theatre and troops and supplies were short.

But in respect

to possible military operations, the organization of Military
92
Command France was synonymous with Army Group "D".
Operations Isabella and Ilona never went into effect.
The fabled German plan to invade and occupy Spain, and per
haps Portugal—the "bug-a-bear" mentioned by Alanbrooke^^—remained a plan, an idea, and never even drew close to
becoming a reality.

Blumentritt wrote that Isabella and

Ilona were worked out, i.e., had a shape and an organization
and definite, recorded goals.

Both plans were based primarily

94
upon the defunct Operation Felix,

But any plan for the

invasxon of th© Iberian peninsula with the goal of defeating
the Spanish and Portugese was what Blumentritt called "a
map operation," a plotting table exercise which "never left
the cupboards of Western Command."

95

It can be assumed, with comparative safety, that
these "map operations" (like Isabella and Ilona) were based

®%alder, VII, 321.
93
Alanbrooke, 195,
^^Blumentritt, 182.
"°Ibid., 182.

-46by and large on Operation Felix. One of them, Operation
r!
Kurfurst, was concerned with a frontal drive into Spain,
much as Isabella was to bring the weight of the Wehrmacht
straight down on newly-landed British forces.

Another,

Operation Gisela, was for the occupation of Spain after
the defeat of the British invaders.

These plans

(Kurfurst and Gisela) were never worked out as were
Isabella and Ilona, and as Blumentritt said, they "remained
in the cupboard."
Out of all this "drafting table" work and "map
operations," one point still emerges.

Adolf Hitler was

not interested in (l) invading Spain and fighting Spaniards,
and (2) the occupation and utilization of Spain, the greatest
asset being Gibraltar, if it meant fighting Spaniards.
the

In

spring and early summer of 1941, and in the year before

it, the German army in the West sat dormant.
hung like a ripe plum.

Gibraltar

Hitler wanted Gibraltar, but

refused to enter the war, to "come into the game."

Spain

And

once Spain had refused. Hitler concerned himself not with
taking his plum, if necessary by force, but rather with
protecting his vastly inferior and obviously disloyal
quasi-ally.

With all the benefits to be gained, militarily,

economically, and politically by the possession of Gibraltar
and the exploitation of Spain, Hitler did nothing.

Why?

CHAPTER H

Fear of a Peninsular War

"One sleeps where Southern vines are drest
Above the noble slain;
He wrapt his colors rotind his brest
On a blood-red field of Spain."
The Graves of a Household,
by Felica Dorothea Hemans,

I

Although no historian, Adolf Hitler was a devotee
if indeed not a student of history.

He constantly found

historical meanings in the events that took place around
him.

In Me in Kampf. he stated that "to learn history means

to search for and to find the forces which cause those
effects which we later face as historical events."

1

Hitler

developed a historical basis for his "intense love of my
native Germany"

2

and repeatedly said that during his school

days history was his favorite subject.
in

It was this training

history, under Professor Doctor Ludwig Poetsch, that made

Hitler, by his own statement, "hate" Austria and "love"
Germany.^

^Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (New York:
Hitchcock, 1939), p. 18,
^Ibid.. 20.
^Ibid., 22.
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-48Although history was his favorite subject. Hitler
was no historian, and historical accuracy was not his
forte.

His school report cards show that Poetsch gave him

4
only "Fair" marks in history courses.

Indeed, this grade

was the usual one received by the young student of Linz.
Hitler's academic career was anything but brilliant, and
he never mastered mathematics, and even received an
5
"Unsatisfactory" in practical geometry.

But his interest

in history was genuine, and he held the discipline in high
esteem.

Years after his study under Poetsch at the tech

nical school in Linz, Hitler wrote that it was decisive for
his entire future life that he had had a teacher "who was
0
as kind as he was firm" and who taught him "to remember
the important, to forget the unimportant,"

7

In his more mature days, Hitler's interest in history
did not flag.

Ernst Hanfstaenglp the companion and social

mentor of the young politician during the late 1920's and
early 1930's, notes in his work Hitler,

The Missing Years;

He (Hitler) was a voracious reader and
positively stormed the historical library
I was building up. He could not read enough
about Frederick the Great and the French
4
/
August Kubizek, The Young Hitler I^ Knew (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1955), p. 51.
^Ibid.. 49.
®Adolf Hitler, Me in Kampf. 19.
"^Ibid.. 18.

-49Revolution, historical parallels out of
which he was trying to distil a policy for
Germany's difficulties. For years the
great Frederick was his hero and he never
tired of quoting examples of the king's
success in building up Prussia in the face
of overwhelming odds. This did not seem
to me a particularly pernicious obsession,
as Frederick had always been a man who knew
where to stop.
It can be held with comparative safety that Hitler
was conscious of the problems in, and the history surrounding,
the Spanish Peninsular Campaign.

He knew a great deal about

Napoleon, and through his reading must have come to realize
the obstacles that would face a modern attempt at the conquest
of the Iberian peninsula* the first of which would most
certainly be that of military resistance.

Would the Spanish

of 1940 fight an invader as they had in 1809, even if that
invader were Germany, the leader of the New Order and a
declared friend of Falangist Spain?
how effectively?

And if they did fight,

General Blumentritt states that Field

Marshal von Rundstedt "had such a high regard for the
Spaniards that he was convinced that they would defend
themselves against any attack, Allied or German,"

9

Hitler

himself recognized the risk:
Occupation of Spain without the consent of
the Spaniards is out of the question, as they

8
(London:

Ernst Hanfstaengl, Hitler. The Missing Years
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957), p. 40,

^Blumentritt, 182,

-50are the only tough Latin people and would
carry on guerilla war in our rear.^®
On their own side, the Spanish were active in giving
to the world the impression that they would resist.

On

February 12, 1942, General Franco and Dr. Salazar (the
dictator-premier of Portugal) met in Seville.

On December

20 of the same year. General Jordana met Dr. Salazar at
Cintra and discussed "Iberian policy,"

The result of these

meetings was the declaration on February 10, 1943, of the
alliance of Spain and Portugal in defense of the Iberian
peninsula.

On that same date Spain announced her intention

to defend her territory against all aggressors.

Germany, it

seems, was aware of the Spanish decision to defend herself
before the announcement by Spain.

On November 11, 1942—

before the meeting at Cintra—Germany had informed Spain
that her neutrality would be respected.
In so far as Spanish military ability is concerned,
however, when one compares German estimates of Spanish
military strength with the Wehrmaeht's in 1940-41, (see
Chapter l) it is obvious that in terms of men and material
the German Panzer and infantry divisions would have had
little trouble in defeating the numerically inferior and
less well-equipped Spaniards.

Spain would probably have

fought the Germans with the fury the French had found so

(London:

^^Anthony Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals
Odhams Press Limited, 1948), p. 172,

\
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horrible in their peninsular campaign, yet Spain's ability
in terms of men and material was such as to make final
victory for the Spaniards more than doubtful.

If the

Wehrmacht, then, were to come to grips with the Spanish
armed forces, the action would most likely go well for the
Germans.
But the Spaniards faced the German forces with not
only between 250,000 and 500,000 armed men, but also with
one of the greatest natural barriers to rapid movement in
all Europe—the Pyrenees.

Spain's entire northern border

is a mountain range of great magnitude.

It extends from

the Bay of Biscay in the west to the Gulf of Lions in the
east, across the entire neck of the Iberian peninsula.

Its

highest peak, Pico de Aneto, rises 11,169 feet, and the rest
of the range is rugged and interlaced with narrow and usually
undeveloped passes, some of them leading into natural box
canyons.

The Pyrenees act as an effective barrier between

France and Spain, and the mountains extend in some places
over one hundred miles in depth, and thus present not only
a barrier in height but in breadth as well.

There are only

two principal highways across the entire range, one on each
coast line, and the passes through the interior mountains
are rugged and high.

Those at Somport, Pourtalet, and

Puymorens are all above 5,000 feet, and that at Roncesvalles
is 3,700 feet.

The Pyrenees through history have been

nature's gift to the Spanish in the way of ready-made forti
fications, much as the Channel has been to England.

-52The Wehrmacht, however, was not an organization to
be dismayed by opposing armies and their fortifications,
man made or not.

The Germans had behind them a record of

conquest of great armies and fortifications that some had
even termed "impregnable,"

The Hela Peninsula, the concrete

and steel fortifications lacing the tortuous fjords of Norway,
the great Belgian fortress of Eben-Emael, the Maginot Line;
all these "unbeatable" fortifications had been all-too-speedily
crushed by the Wehrmacht,
There was yet another consideration that played a
part in the thinking of the Wehrmacht and its Leader.

For

it one must turn, as indeed Hitler must have, to history.
In April 1809 the British Army, once driven out of the Iberian
peninsula by the French, returned and landed in Portugal.
was comaiandsd by Lord Henry Wellesley.

It

In the years that

followed that landing, to the defeat of the French forces in
Spain in 1812-13, there raged on the Iberian peninsula one
of the bloodiest and most barbarous wars of modern times.
Spain witnessed two armies of two of the most modern nations
in the world decimate each other.

The Spaniard himself

joined in, and the accounts of the suffering of the French
at the hands of the Spanish guerrillas behind the lines
make morbid reading.

Hitler knew that Napoleon had made

mistakes, and he firmly maintained that he was not going to
make the same errors.

Throughout his Table l^lks he again

-53and again mentioned the mistakes of Napoleon and condemned
them as stupid and fraught with danger.
Considering the obstacles facing Hitler regarding
an armed invasion and occupation of Spain:

a small, and

perhaps poorly armed but experienced and determined army,
a natural belt of fortifications running across the entire
length of the invasion route, a people historically proven
for their natural fervor and ability in the face of an
invader, and finally the biggest obstacle of all—the awful
event of intervention by the British thereby opening up a
new front in an area not fitted for tank warfare and the
rapid transport of supplies, it is little wonder that the
Fuehrer seriously questioned any plan for an invasion of
Spain and turned his eyes elsewhere.

The historical

precedent—Napoleon—bore no good omen.

And the British

themselves had set out to give the Fuehrer more than
Napoleonic history upon which to base his Judgement.
In April, 1940, 'foe British moved into Norway, under
what they called the "Stratforce Plan,"

They were promptly

driven back out again by a superior ffehrmacht, A year later,
in the spring of 1941, the British went to the aid of the
embattled Greeks against the Italians.

The situation became

so bad that German troops, indeed whole armies, had to be
sent to assist the faltering Italians and secure the tip of

^^Adolf Hitler, Table Talks. 310-11, 326, 456, 473,

573.

-54the Balkans for the Axis (see Chapter V),

But the amazing

thing about these British interventions is that they took
place at a time—between April, 1940 to April, 1941—when
not only were the British Isles for most of the time to be
threatened with invasion, but the forces that were sent to
Greece brought about the giving up of North African territory
just wrested from the Axis armies (see Chapter VI).

The

British thus proved that they would intervene if their
interests were seriously affected, as in Norway and Greece,
A German invasion of the Iberian peninsula would have
affected British interests in a manner that would have been
intolerable, (see Chapter l) and any threat to Gibraltar and
the Strait would almost certainly have been met by a strong
British counter-action, as in Norway and Greece.

These

facts must have been plain to the Fuehrer in 1940-41,

II

Lord Alanbrooke, writing in his work Turn of The Tide.
stated:
Until now (1940-41) the (Royal) Army had played
a comparatively small part in the Government's
calculations for winning the war. Though much
the largest of the three services, it had counted
for less in the struggle for survival than the
navy and the air force. The first call on the
nations resources and skilled manpower had been
naval and aerial. With the gradual extension of
the call-up the Army by now (1941) numbered two
and a quarter million men, with nine hundred
thousand more in the Commonwealth, Indian and
Empire forces.,.,Yet only a small proportion of
these were front line troops organized in mobile

-55field units. After two years of war there were
still only half a dozen divisions in the country
fully armed and equipped to fight the Germans
on the Continent,
At Dunkirk only 337,131 men had been saved, but most of
their equipment and heavy arms had to be left behind or
destroyed.

Many of these survivors were not British, but

French, Czech, Dutch, and Belgian.

But what is of real

importance is that despite their weakness the British had
gone to great pains to organize, equip, and keep in permanent
readiness two divisions prepared to occupy the Atlantic
Islands or French North Africa in the event of an Axis move
through Spain or against Vichy.

Lord Alanbrooke stated

that these divisions "were able to proceed overseas at
13
immediate notice."
And even more important, in 1942 and 1943 the Allies
agreed that all preparations be pressed for a cross-channel
invasion, and studies be carried out as to when and where the
best landing on the Continent could be effected.

But at

this same time, Churchill insisted that the possibility of
alternative action on the Iberian peninsula be "considered
by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Thus, although it can be charged that their prepara
tions were inadequate, the British had prepared to some

^^Alanbrooke, 26G,
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., 339.
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Haider himself pointed out

again and again the not too friendly attitude of the
Portugese toward the Germans,

15

and Blumentritt wrote;

From time to time anxiety arose at the head
quarters of the German Wehrmaeht that the
Allies might land in Portugal or Spain.,,in
the south, to invade the area of Western
Command,
It was upon these fears, of course, that the defensive opera
tions of Isabella and Ilona were based, although these plans
(see Chapter I) never reached any real measure of prepardeness
nor operational ability.
The Wehrmaeht's, and Hitler's, fear that the British
might intervene in the event of a German drive into Spain
was valid.

The intervention was not only possible, but in

light of Norway and Greece, probable.

As Lord Alanbrooke

pointed out, both the British and the Germans realized that
to control Gibraltar was to control the western Mediterranean
and the gate-way to that entire area.

If the Germans held

Gibraltar they would threaten Britain in a way so vital as
to be catastrophic.

These threats, multitudinous in scope,

have been analysed in Chapter I,

Churchill realized the

situation and made his plans accordingly.

From an observa

tion of the available facts, we can surmise with relative
safety that the Fuehrer did the same,
1^
Haider, V, 14, 46, 4; VI, 135,
^^Blumentritt, 182,

-57It cannot be held that the above mentioned obstacles
to a German invasion of Spain were the main turning points
of the Fuehrer's thinking.

There were other more important

considerations and events, but the threat of Spanish resis
tance in a tortuous and almost impassable mountain range,
combined with the possibility of British intervention and
Spanish guerrilla warfare, must have presented a sobering
picture to the Fuehrer and his Wehrmacht.

On the basis of

such fears or "obstacles"—especially when they are con
sidered in the light of history—a plausible argument can
be put forth that one of the many reasons Hitler did not go
into Spain with armed force and "pick his plum" (Gibraltar)
was the fear of a peninsular war.

CaAPTEE III

The Facade and the Spirit

"Let there be no strife, I pray thee, between
thee and me, for we are brethren,"
Genesis, xiii, 8.

I

Adolf Hitler felt no great attraction for the
Spanish way of life, either its government or polities.
Although Franco's dictatorship was ostensibly fascia and
bore some similarities to Hitler's Germany, the Fuehrer
found many of its aspects not to his taste.

Throughout his

Table Talks ^ he repeatedly referred to the bad effects in
Spain of what he termed "Church control," of a slipshod
political unity, of an unrealistic and anarchistic economic
policy, and he bitterly denounced the "priests and monarch
ists who have joined together to seize power in Spain.
His subordinates, like Goebbels, who followed the Master's
line, spoke of Franco during 1941 and after as "weak," or
as "a useless politician," and characterized the Spanish

^Adolf Hitler, Table Talks. 422,

-59government as "opportunistic," "disloyal," and "ungrate
ful."^
But

to have Hitler's liking, or respect, or comrade

ship in the New Order was no guarantee of freedom from either
verbal abuse or military vassalage.

Even Italy's "Elder

Statesman" of fascism and Hitler's good "friend" was not
immune from German insults, and considering the Fuehrer's
treatment of the Duce—giving him orders, summoning him to
conferences on short notice, intervening in Italian military
affairs uninvited—it is understandable why, at least once,
the Duce lost his temper, stamped his 'foot, jutted out his
jaw, and declared that he would endure it no longer.

Ciano

heard his master denouncing the Germans as "dirty dogs,"
complaining that they (the Germans) "take everything and
leave us only a pile of bones," and "that this cannot go on
for long."

3

The Duce roared that he was "sick and tired of

being rung for."

4

Nor did it please Mussolini's ego when he

learned that the current German joke in that year of 1940-41
was to refer to him as the "Gauleiter of Italy."
As strange as it may seem, Spain and its leader.
General Franco, never had to endure the affronts suffered

2

Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries. edited and
translated by Louis P. Lochner (New York: Doubleday, 1948),
pp. 119, 124, 166.
3

Count Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, edited by
Hugh Gibson (New York: Doubleday, 1946), p. 304.
^Ibid., 360.

-60by Germany's prime ally, Italy.

Until October 23, 1940, at

Hendaye, the Fuehrer had never met his Spanish "ally," and
the meeting was a test of whether or not Franco would become
the "Gauleiter of Spain."

Haider noted at that time (Novem

ber 1, 1940) that Hitler heaped upon Franco's head the abuse
5
due such "Jesuit trickery" and "misplaced Spanish pride."
But verbal abuse was about the extent of it.

Hitler returned

to Germany without having achieved Franco's conversion to
his—Hitler's—plans to take Gibraltar.

At Hendaye the Chief

of the Spanish State had been friendly and even enthusiastic,
but according to the memorandum prepared by the German govern
ment on the meeting, no commitment was made by Franco to

6

Hitler.

The Spaniard preferred to wait and see what the

future would bring before he took Spain into the war.

And a

full day of the Fuehrer's pontificating could not make him
change his mind.
One reason why Hitler avoided military intervention
in Spain—the desire to avoid a peninsular war—has been
discussed.

Lord Alanbrooke offers another:

The Spanish dictator was a declared friend to
Germany and Italy and under great obligation to
them. Yet when that October Hitler met Franco
at Hendaye and asked him to join the Axis, that
shrewd despot, aware that Britain had defeated thfe
Luftwaffe and still held the seas around Spain,
had been curiously evasive. He had been fiill of
assurances but had promised nothing. And though

%alder, V, 3,
^Gantenbein, 727-28,

-61Hitler was very angry, he did not consider it
worth while to shatter his ideological facade of
a New Order in Europe...by forcing his way through
the tej^ritory of a Fascist and ostensibly friendly
state,
To what degree the Fuehrer let the facade of the New Order
influence his thinking is difficult to measure.

But from

his writings, words, and actions—-and from those of his
immediate subordinates—it is possible to estimate their
thinking and the effect on it of the fagade.
The phrase New Order was not a glib bit of propa
ganda emanating from Dr. Joseph Goebbels' Ministry.

Rather,

the New Order was a real and visualized system for the re
organization of the world in general and of Europe in
particular.

John Robert Bengtson, in his work Nazi War

Alms: The Plans for the Thousand Year

Reich. states that

the ksy to the thinking of the leaders of the German state,
the basic consideration upon which was built the New Order,
was the issue of race.

The Nazis believed their racial

theories, and one of the reasons they fought the war was to
put their theories into practice.

Hitler, as Germany's

absolute ruler, istands out as the master planner of the
New Order.

Men such as Otto Strasser and Hermann Rauschning

8

assisted him in his evolvement of the plan.
7
Alanbrooke, 57,
Q

John Robert Bengtson, "Nazi War Aims;
The Plans for
the Thousand Year Reich" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Department of History, State University of Iowa, 1953), p. 134,

-62The Nazis considered the English, Italians, and
surprisingly enough the Spanish, as Nordic peoples.

And

in Hitler's New Order these peoples at least were to he
nominally independent, and were each to rule over an
empire of their own.

An Anglo-German alliance was to have

been one of the cornerstones of Hitler's foreign policy,
and almost to the very end of the war Hitler believed that
he somehow could reach an understanding with the English on
the basis of which Germany would be free to build an empire
on the European Continent while Great Britain would rule
9
the seas, the home islands, and the colonies.

Even when

the end of the war was very near, in April, 1945, the Fuehrer
rejoiced to learn of the death of President Roosevelt, for
now, he felt, the Allies would quickly become racked by
dissension and fall apart, and Germany would join the West,
Great Britain and the United States, in a great counteroffensive against Communism in the East.^^

The "miracle of

the House of Brandenburg," however, was not to be repeated,
and the Fuehrer soon saw his last fantastic hope dashed as
the Wehrmacht continued to retreat on all fronts.

The Anglo-

German alliance, a main building block of the New Order,
was a wish—not a reality.

^Bengtson, 2, 3, 40.
^®John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954), p. 611.

-63The Italian empire in Europe under the plan for the
New Order was to include the lands along the eastern shores
of the Adriatic Sea, Greece, and a portion of France.

The

rest of Europe was to have been annexed to the Reich or made
into vassel states subject to Germany's disposal.

Aside

from Italy, the only exception was the Iberian Peninsula,
where the Spanish were to have ruled supreme I
The available evidence would indicate that the Fuehrer
was not a person lightly to throw aside, without the most
serious reasons, so basic a concept of world reorganization
as that of the New Order.

This being so, it becomes a

little more understandable why, as Lord Alanbrooke said.
Hitler did not consider it worth his while to shatter the
facade of the New Order by quixotic action in Spain.

For an

invasion and occupation of Spain, a proposed partner in the
New Order, would tend to do just that.

II

With this unwillingness to shatter his ideological
facade. Hitler faced the problem of the unoccupied Iberian
Peninsula,

But there were additional factors to be considered.

Hitler was accustomed as a politician to thinking in terms
of politics, international relations, economics, personalities,
and prestige.

These considerations were often contradictory

^^Bengtson, 134,

-64-

to purely military necessities.

In other words, he allowed

political, diplomatic, economic, personal, or prestige con
siderations to affect military decisions, often to the horror
of the Wehrmacht.

Felix Gilbert, in his work Hitler Directs

His War, illustrates this vividly:
What Hitler found lacking in the professionals'
(soldiers) approach to war emerges clearly from
the conference records. He considered three
aspects of modern war as of decisive importance.
One is morale....Secondly, Hitler placed great
emphasis on making full use of modern techniques.
...The third factor was politics. When questions
like the retreat of the southern wing of the
Russian front were discussed, political considera
tions such as the repercussions on Turkey or
Rumania weighed most heavily with him. Emphasis
on such factors as these, or at least a different
evaluation of their importance, formed the chief
dividing line between Hitler and the generals,
The catastrophe of Stalingrad serves as an example.

Hitler

attached great political significance to the capture of
Stalingrad:
To him it was not only a military but also a
psychological objective, and he was convinced
that, once this city, named after one of the
two heroes of revolutionary Russia, had fallen
into his hands, the political regime of the
Soviet Union would crumble and c o l l a p s e . 13
Thus, Hitler committed one and a half million men against
Stalingrad, an objective of no great military value and
certainly not worthy of so high an expenditure of troops.
But the winter of 1942-43 witnessed the Wehrmacht's loss
12
Felix Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1950), p. xxiil.
^^Wheeler-Bennett, 531,
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of 600,000 men at Stalingrad—all in an attempt to gain a
"psychological objective,"

Further, as has already been

mentioned (Chapter l). Hitler in 1941 ordered that sorely
needed armored divisions be removed from the brittle Russian
front and sent to France in order to "bolster German pres
tige and show the world that Germany still has available
forces over and above what is needed on the Russian Front."
The fact that this removal of needed strength from the East
would do more harm than good did not affect the Fuehrer.
He was so interested in presenting a "good front," and if
one had to send armored divisions to France in order to do
so, then armored divisions would go to France I
Another illustration of Hitler's preoccupation with
political aspects as against military aspects regarding a
given problem is to be found in the work of Karl Bart?,
Swastika in the Air;
In the Spring of 1942, the visual system of nightfighting was at its peak. Kills were increasing
and Kammhuber (Chief of the Luftwaffe nightfighter squadrons) even hoped that they would
rise enough to discourage the enemy. To bring
this about he increased the strength of both the
night-fighting squadrons and the search-light
batteries. The successes obtained between
Arnhem and Munster were particularly encouraging
and it began to look as though Kammhuber might
reach his objective (of discouraging British
bombing raids). Morale amongst the nightfighters was particularly high. Then came
sudden and unexpected orders from Hitler: all
search-light batteries...were to be transferred
to the anti-aircraft defences for co-operation

^%alder, VI, 213,
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-66with the guns. The justification of this order
came from a source close to Hitler: 'The night
fighters don't shoot down much anyway, and
Kammhuber is imposing an intolerable burden on
industry."
But the real reason was that the
RAF had made diversionary raids on Munich and
Vienna, and it was revealed that the air defences
of those two big cities were anything but ade
quate, After the raids, their Gauleiter hurried
excitedly to Hitler complaining bitterly and
pointing to the damaging effect upon public
morale. The result was the order concerning
the search-lights. Once again the reasons for
an important order issued by Hitler had been
political. For prestige reasons and to please
his Gauleiter Hitler interfered with Kammhuber's
work to defend Germany from the air and decrived
him of one of his most important weapons.
Is it too difficult in the light of these observa
tions to picture the Fuehrer in 1941 pondering and asking
himself:

"If I do invade Spain, and assuming that I can

subdue the Spanish and keep the British out, or defeat
them if they come in, what have I won?

Is Gibraltar

worth the ill-will and suspicion of my allies?

Will they

think that if I have invaded one member of the New Order
that I will invade others?
land, Sweden, and Turkey,

What of the neutrals, Switzer
Can I invade a neutral state

such as they and suffer no serious consequences?

What of

f

Vichy-France?
react?

How will Petain (ruler of Vichy-France)

What of French North Africa?

Can I afford such

a gamble, especially in the light of the political
considerations?"

Karl Bartz, Swastika in the Air (London:
Kimber, 1956), pp. 112-13o
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-67In 1940-41, the Germans were attempting to build
their New Order on something more than military conquest
alone.

Realpolitik, as Hitler saw it, was based on more

than fighting.

Hitler's favorite weapons, politics and

political dealings, were in great part responsible for
some of his notable war-time successes.

Rumania was

"peacefully occupied" on December 31, 1940,

The following

January, pressure was brought to bear upon Bulgaria, which
became a party to the Three Power Pact on March 1 (exactly
as Hitler had told Franco at Hendaye half-a-year before).
Next, Yugoslavia joined the Axis camp on March 25, 1941,
Could the Fuehrer afford to antagonize, to cause serious
reservations, on the part of these new "allies" by an act
of out-right agression in neutral (and yet quasi-allied)
Spain?
During the spring of 1941 von Ribbentrop expressed
the widespread German conviction when he stated that "the
war is won,"

X6

By this time the Germans had begun an

intensive campaign to draw Vichy-France into the Axis camp,
and after June, 1941, Goebbels mentioned that the Germans
had managed to persuade Vichy to send battle units to the
Eastern Front to fight side-by-side with the Germans,

17

Haider noted in detail the German "toe-dance" to keep the
1 fi
Ciano, 306,

17

Goebbels, 85,

-68Petain regime loyal and respectful, but at the same time
affable.

For example, he observed that in November, 1940,

the Fuehrer had issued an order to the German military

18
government in France to "go slow" in Vichy.
The behind the scenes Italian objections to a
Vichy-German alliance were understood but met with little
sympathy in higher German circles,

Haider, for instance,

wrote on November 18, 1940, that:
Eventually, the conviction that Italy is an
unreliable partner became the determining
factor in the decision to continue in our
original policy (under the armistice) toward
(Vichy) France.
Although the Italian hatred of France is outside the scope
of this thesis, suffice it to say that the Italian aspira
tion to humiliate a traditional enemy and acquire rich
colonial and continental lands to add to the new "Italian
Empire" under the New Order was in large part the motive
for the underhanded Italian moves.
Considering the foregoing, then, it becomes a little
clearer that while the military sub-leaders of the German
Reich were primarily interested in the military considera
tions of the war, the Fuehrer, as both head of the military
and

head of the state, found it necessary to consider many

facets of a problem, among which the military was only one.

^^Halder, V, 29,
^^Ibid.

-69While the Fuehrer was beyond doubt ready and willing to
concede that invaluable military advantages were to be gained
from a conquest of Spain and Gibraltar, he at the same time
found this invasion and conquest a danger to, and in contra
diction of, the entire concept of the New Order.

How could

he rightly invade and subdue a Nordic people, future leaders
under his scheme for the future Europe?

And what of the

catastrophic effects upon the newly acquired allies, to say
nothing of the Finns or the still relatively powerful VichyFrance, which possessed natural and population resources as
well as the second largest colonial empire in the world?
What of the effect on the other neutral states?

How would

they view an invasion of a state that was strictly speaking
exactly like them—neutral?

In the spring and early summer

of 1941 this question had real import,

Gould the Reich

afford a possible Turko-Russian "interdependence" or worse
yet their alliance?

Might Sweden assume an attitude hostile

to the point of denying Germany needed iron ore?
of the outside world?

And what

How would it look to have two Fascist

states fighting each other, with the British there to make
capital out of the situation?

This would most definitely

not be a "food front,"
Although these questions may seem somewhat trite at
present, in the mind of the Fuehrer in 1941, they no doubt
existed in some form.

He made important decisions for

political and prestige reasons of much less weight.

Undoubtedly Hitler weighed the gains against the risks.

Even

if the military problems regarding an armed invasion of the
Iberian peninsula could be overcome, was the venture worth
the terrible political risk?!
destruction of the bas ic

Was it worth the possible

war aim, the great and final goal^

Was it worth shattering the facade of the New Order??

Ill

There is another aspect or ""facet" of the problem
that, while not strictly a part of the above, is akin to
it.

Adolf Hitler was the ultimate deciding force in

Germany,

As General Jodl said, "Apart from Hitler there

was no powerful man; there was not and could be no influen—

20
tial man next to him,"

During his interrogation. General

Palkenhorst, the commander of the Norwegian campaign, statedi
He (Hitler) talked to each single admiral. He
listened to each general and had him explain
exactly what his task was, even to the commanders
of the boats, and discussed with them whether
they would drop men to the left or right of a
certain objective. He went into everything.
It was his idea. It was his plan. It was his
PI
war
Hitler, then, was the actual, not just the titular head of
22
the Wehrmacht.
His decision was final. An invasion of
20
United States Department of State, Nuremberg
Proceedings (Washington D. C.: Upited States Government
Printing Office, 1947), XV, p. 43,
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Bengtson, 14«
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-71the Iberian peninsula was a decision that ultimately rested
with the Fuehrer.

The history of German-Spanish relations

had been one of co-operation.

The two nations, separated

by the French land-mass, had never fought each other in
modern times, and certainly could not be ranked opposite
each other as traditional enemies in those two column
charts that diplomatic historians so enjoy drawing up.
Thus, there existed no grounds upon which it could be
claimed that Germany could have invaded Spain in 1940 or
in 1941 with similar reasons or nationalistic motivations
that she gave for her invasion of France.

In other words,

there existed no precedent for war, no galling grievance,
no ancient hatred.
Rather, the Nazi regime in Germany and the National
ist regime in Spain found ground for mutual understanding
and co-operation (except for the leading personalities
involved).

After all, they were both "fascist" and both

members (as far as Hitler was concerned) of the New Order,
But the important consideration is that the Fuehrer, despite
his criticism of Spanish governmental methods, even after
his denunciation of Spanish ways and his vitriolic condemna
tion of "Jesuit trickery," found that he could not move
against Spain as he was to later move against Vichy-France
and even Italy.

For the fact is that Adolf Hitler liked

Spain, and he liked the Spaniards.

-72In the Table Talks, those private, off-the-reoord,
informal conversation notes that Hitler planned to use as
source material for the books he intended to write after the
war, he again and again talked of Spain and the Spaniards.
And while he heaped scorn on the heads of the clergy, the
monarchists, and finally even the governmental leaders, he
praised the Spaniards, and the virtues of the common people
of the peninsula.

Hitler touted the Spanish troops of the

Blue Diviston fighting on the Eastern Front (see Chapter I),
On September 5, 1942, he went on to say:
I think one of the best things we ever did
was to permit a Spanish Legion to fight at
our side. On the first opportunity I shall
decorate Munoz Grande with the Iron Cross
with Oak Leaves and Diamonds.,.When the time
comes for the Legion to return to Spain, we
must re-equip them on a regal scale, give
them a heap of booty, and a handful of
Russian generals as trophies.
It appears that Hitler felt that the Spanish were a
noble people, and he held that the Spaniard and the American,
for example, could never understand each other. "The Americans
live like sows," he said, "in a most luxurious sty."

24

The

Spaniard, on the other hand, was cultured and intelligent,
if not so materialistic.

25

The Spaniard was of Gaulic and

Arabic origin, maintained Hitler, and as such had the good

23Adolf Hitler, Table Talks. 563.
2^Ibid., 492.
^^Ibid., 493.

-73qualities of both.

It was the Catholic Church that had

ruined Spain, corrupted her leaders, and made her backward.
The Fuehrer punctuated this statement with another that in
the light of Nazi actions seems quite out of place;

"In

Madrid, the sickening odour of the heretic's pyre remained
for two centuries mingled with the air one breathed,"

20

As far as Hitler was concerned, it was the clergy
and the crown that had made the Spanish people take brutal
means to get rid of brutality.

If the Spanish people were

backward, that was the fault of their priests and their
leaders, of that "Pontius," Franco, and the •• grave-digger
-v*
27
of modem Spain," Serrano Suner.
The true Spaniard was

a noble person, and his great hope was Fascism,
Spaniard drove out the priests, he would rise.

28

Once the
So thought

V« A tr* II^ 1% -V* r\ "v*

In the spring of 1942, Hitler stated that VichyFrance—-toward whom German policy had greatly changed by
that time—could still "save herself"' and become a member
of the victorious Axis if she would give up some continental
territory and some colonial areas in North Africa.

Germany

would even compensate her with new colonies in Central Africa
(to be taken from the British after the final victory).

The

surprising fact about this arrangement is that those North

^®Adolf Hitler, Table Talks. 235,
^'^Ibid.. 493.
^^Ibid.. 418.

74African colonies were to go to Italy and to the ''ungrateful'*'
29
Spanish.

Admost two years after Franco had refused, by

deed if not by word, to enter the war, Hitler was still con
cerned about the Spanish and their future empire.
Although he was periodically the butt of the Fuehrer's
wrath, it was not until late 1942 that Hitler began to call
Franco "the stirrup-holder" for a future Spanish king.

This

is a baser insult than it appears, for by then the Fuehrer
30
hated royalty and all things connected with it.

From that

time on, the Spanish Chief of State came in for much more
criticism.

But all the while Hitler criticized the Spanish

government and the Spanish Church, he praised the Spanish
people.

For example. Hitler mentioned that the Spanish

workers in the Todt Organization—the German civil construc
tion corps—were "first class."

He went on to say that the

more Germany could recruit the better, since they were very
31
good workers, with excellent discipline.
Later yet. Hitler heaped more abuse on the Spanish
leaders, and said that Franco and Simer were "stupid parsons,"
'^'seduced by royalty," and were "i^grates.

At the same time,

he stated that the Spanish press was the best in Europe I
29
Adolf Hitler, Table Talks, 216.
OA
Ibid,. 563.
qi
Ibid., 462.
^^Ibid.. 563.
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-75This was because the Spanish people were so "cultured."
Again, the Fuehrer expounded the theory that the Russian
people, unlike the Spanish, were slaves of their priests
or their commissars.

The Spaniards, he maintained, "hate

their clergy and will soon throw their priests out."

33

When

that happened, Spain would enter upon a new and better day.
These are a few examples of the "liking" the Fuehrer
felt toward the Spanish,

One would not be justified in

holding that the main reason Hitler failed to invade Spain
was his affability toward the Spanish, but on the other hand
this "liking" did bear some results, or rather aided in
bringing them about.

In May, 1943, the Commander-in-Chief

of the German navy, Admiral Raeder, recommended to the
Fuehrer "the occupation of Spain and Gibraltar," in order
to give the navy needed ocean frontage and submarine pen
sites on the Atlantic and Mediterranean that were relatively
free from enemy air attacks.

Ihe Fuehrer, in answer to this

recommendation, curtly replied:
This was still possible in 1940, carrying
Spain along with us, but our forces are not
sufficient for this purpose now, and it would
be against Spain's will.
/italics mine^^!
Also, one must not forget the statement of the Fuehrer
contained in Chapter II:
Occupation of Spain without the consent of the
Spaniards is out of the question, as they are
OQ

Adolf Hitler, Table Talks. 493.

34

Nazi Conspiracy and Ajj^gression. Supp. A, 1025.

-76the only tough Latin people and would carry on
guerilla war in our rear.^® /Tralics min^.
It is difficult to find another example where the Fuehrer's
decision to invade or not to invade a country was affected,
especially to the high degree seen in this case, by his
desire not to offend those who did not care to be invaded.
There are then, two closely related lines of thought
in the writings, words, and actions of the Fuehrer and his
Wehrmacht,

One was the desire to maintain the facade, the

aversion to shattering the concept of the New Order.

This

thinking manifested itself in Hitler's wish to keep on the
best relations with his new allies, Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary, Finland, and Vichy-France, especially in the crucial
year of 1941, as well as to present the best front possible
to the neutral states and to the enemy.

The other was

Hitler's attitude toward the Spanish, his liking of the
Spanish as a people, his respect for their courage and
racial virtue.

Hitler believed that the Spanish were a

Nordic and a worthy people, who would after the war rule
an empire that would be part of the New Order, that final
and supreme end which he sincerely felt Providence had
placed him on this earth to bring about.

35

Martienssen, 172.

CHAPTER IV

The Economy of Forces:

Western Front

"We are waiting for the long-promised invasion.
So are the fishes."
Winston Churchill,
during a BBC broadcast
to the French people,
October 21, 1940.

I

During the warm summer days of 1940, after the occupa
tion of Norway and the conquest of the Lowlands and France,
German troops, flushed with victory, sat in cafes in Paris
and Antwerp and Oslo gleefully singing the popular song of
the day;

Wir fahren igegen England.

The confidence of both

song writers and troops found official expression in Fuehrer
Directive No. 16 of July 16, 194G-T-three weeks after the
fall of France.

This was Hitler's ordgr f®^

invasion

of England, for a massive assault of the home islands in an
effort to defeat the British armed forces and force the
British government to bring the war to an end,
Peter Fleming, in Operation Sea Lion, gives a detailed
picture of the plans and preparations for the invasion and
occupation of the British home islands during the late summer
of 1940.

General Haider, too, in his War Journal, recorded

-78the involved preparations in minute detail.

The history of

those preparations and of the failure of Operation Sea Lion
is beyond the scope of this thesis.

But it is essential that

the part played by the planned invasion of Britain in the
sphere of German-Spanish relations—and the Wehrmacht's
failure to invade Spain—be brought out.
During the summer of 1940, when Germany controlled
the shores of the Continent from the north of Norway to the
Bay of Biscay, Hitler had other problems to consider besides
Spain and th« British-held "Rock" at its southernmost extrem
ity.

Those other considerations were of a military nature,

and they were of the utmost importance.

For in that critical

period—July 1940 to June 1941—the Fuehrer was faced with
an agonizing choice.
If he continued his westward movsment, across the
channel and into England, and failed, he would not only lose
prestige and the bulk of Germany's available shipping, but,
by depriving himself of the means of making another attack,
release the growing British army and air force for operations
elsewhere, perhaps even on the Continent.

On the other hand,

if he Ignored the Islanders and attempted to move through
Spain, capture Gibraltar, and invade North Africa, he would
face them on a wider front with thinner defenses.

He could

not afford to leave the British alone after their refusal of
a peace, for with the support of their backers in the United
States they would grow steadily stronger, particularly in the

-79air, and ultimately confront him with that major war on two
fronts, which it had been his object to avoid.
And there was still another factor of the problem
to be considered, a factor of the greatest magnitude.

Lord

Alanbrooke puts it thus:
To the east of the Reich, incorporating the
plains of eastern Poland and the Ukraine and
the Caucasian oil fields he had resolved to
conquer, lay the Communist empire of Russia,
with its vast resources and population and
its Ten-Year Plan of industrialization,
threatening Hitler with a mechanized military
power that would presently surpass his own.
Sooner or later, if he delayed his eastward
march, he knew that he would have to face a
Russian attack—a possibility of which he had
been unpleasantly reminded during his summer
campaign in the West when the USSR had annexed
the Baltic states and Rumanian Bessarabia.
Hitler was convinced that in spite of all their admiration
and fear of the mighty Wehrmacht, and all their professions
of friendship, the Soviet leaders were only playing for time.
It seemed essential, therefore, that if he could not induce
Britain to make peace, he must either rid himself of her by
sudden invasion and occupation, or keep her growing air and
land forces tied down by the threat of invasion until the
Soviet danger at the "backdoor" of the Reich could be dealt
with.
Hitler himself best described his dilemma.

As he

put it, he was "in the position of a man with only one round

^Alanbrooke, 195,

-soleft in his rifle; if he missed, the situation would be worse
than before."

2

He could not afford to leave the British

alone, and he could not ignore the growing threat to the
Reich in the East,

He had one round left in his rifle.

Which way should he shoot?

East?

Or West?

In the face of this problem the importance of the
British outpost of Gibraltar appreciably lessened.

The

Fuehrer, especially in 1940, had a military machine he felt
was capable of crushing any enemy including England or Russia,
but only one at a time.

From the events of that summer, from

the actions of the Fuehrer and even more of his Wehrmacht, it
becomes apparent that in the summer of 1940 Hitler chose to
move first against England.

He reasoned that the threat of

invasion would force the English to retain most of their
forces in the home islands, thereby freeing Africa, the
Balkans, and the Iberian Peninsula from the danger of large
concentrations of British forces and would keep Russia to the
East primfirily dependent upon her own resources for invasion
or defense.
On July 30, 1940, General Haider made an entry in
his War Journal that summed up the main points of the German
strategy.

That strategy (the invasion of England) was to

be drastically changed in a short time, but was at that

2

Alanbrooke, 194.
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time a real and deadly serious plan of action. General
Haider wrote:
The question whether, if a decision cannot
be forced against Britain (surrender), we
should in the face of a threatening BritishRussian alliance and the resulting two front
war turn first against Russia, must be
answered to the effect that we should keep
on friendly terms with Russia. A visit to
Stalin would be desirable, Russia's aspira
tions to the Straits and in the direction
of the Persian Gulf need not bother us. On
the Balkans, which falls within our sphere
of interest, we could keep out of each other's
way. Italy and Russia will not hurt each
other in the Mediterranean. This being so,
we could deliver the British a decisive blow
in the Mediterranean,.and with the aid of
Russia consolidate the Reich we have created
in Western and Northern Europe. That much
being accomplished, we could confidently
face war with Britain for years.^
The invasion of England was a project that had been
4
worked on by the German navy since 1939.

Admiral Raeder,

the Commander-in-Chief of the German navy, pushed the project
himself, and finally won the Fuehrer's assent to it in June,
1940.^

On July 2, Keitel, Chief of the OKW, issued instruc

tions to the three services to prepare invasion plans, but
it was not until July 16 that Hitler signed a directive
fixing the middle of August as the time by which preparations
6
were to be completed.

On July 21, Hitler made his famous

IT"

Haider, IV, 141.

4
Bengtson, 95.
5
Alan Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny (London:
Odhams Press Limited, 1952), p. 544-45.
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-82Reichstag speech, which was a warning to the British that he
was coming and that their only hope was to capitulate.

II

In Operation Sea Lion Peter Fleming pointed out that
in Germany after the war it became the custom to speak of the
proposed invasion of England as an almost "whimsical project
7
which nobody took seriously at the time."
He quoted German
wartime personalities who stated that the preparations went
forward in the relaxed and academic atmosphere of a "Kriegspiel," a training maneuver.

Other writers have advanced

variations of the theme that the invasion was only a kind of
strategic doodling.

The facts do not support them.

The most important of these facts is that the Fuehrer
ordered that the invasion be carried out.

His order may have

lacked the crispness, the detail that other orders of this
type contained, but it did not lack the compulsion.

Hitler

issued Directive No, 16 before he realized the difficulties
that the invasion would bring.

But even after those diffi

culties had been made plain to him he in no way changed the
order, nor did he, even provisionally, commit the great
military machine which he had driven headlong to the Channel
coast to any alternative strategyo
7
Fleming, 238,
®Ibid., 328.

8

On July 21, five days

-83after he had issued his order, Hitler told those present at
a conference on naval affairs:
The invasion of England is an exceptionally
daring undertaking, because even if the way
is short this is not just a river crossing,
but the crossing of a sea which is dominated
by the enemy. This is not the case of a
single-crossing operation as in Norway;
operational surprise cannot be expected; a
defensively prepared and utterly determined
enemy faces and dominates the sea we must
use. For the army forty divisions will be
required..
Here, in the middle of July, the Fuehrer illustrated beyond
all doubt the fact that he fully understood the gigantic
problems the proposed invasion presented.
Further, had there existed a plan for the systematic
reduction of England by the bombers of the Luftwaffe, it
might be possible to maintain that the three Air Fleets which
were set in a great half-circle facing the southern and
eastern shores of the Island played all the while an ulterior
role.

One might hold that instead of being assigned only

the duty of paving the way for Operation Sea Lion, that
those forces were the real instrument of Hitler's design.
But no such ulterior plan existed.

The air offensive

against London and other British cities was not planned as
an insurance against the invasion having proven impossible.
In point of fact, the air offensive was not planned at all.
Directive No, 16 stated:

^Bullock, 545,

"In this operation elements of the

-84air force will do the work of the artillery..."

10

And this

is just what the bombers of the Luftwaffe were doing when
Operation Sea Lion was cancelled.

The only reason the

bombers still flew over London after the cancellation (as
Fleming points out) was that they had been given nothing
else to doi
Fuehrer Directive No. 17, of August 1, 1940j called
for an intensification of air and sea warfare against England
but did not lay down a long-range bombing policy such as was
devised by the Allies in 1943 and 1944.

It was an order for

more destruction by the "artillery," nothing more.

It was in

no sense an alternative strategy.
Hitler, in the summer of 1940, stood firm in his
decision to conquer first the West and then the East.

On

November 23, 1940, he harangued his Goaimaaders-in-chief and
stated that a move against the East could only be commenced
when the West was secure.
Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of England, was not
a "Kriegspiel."

It was, during the summer and fall of 1940,

a real and serious project. And after all, the problem of
Gibraltar would have been quickly solved by an invasion and
occupation of Britain and the subsequent capitulation of the
British government.

10

It was not until October, 1940, that

Fleming, 239,

^^Ibid,

-85Hitler began to think seriously about a combined GermanSpanish assault on Gibraltar, and then only through the
12
urging of Goering and Raeder.
By that time Operation Sea
Lion was for all intents and purposes postponed.

And the so

called "postponement" was its death.
The foregoing has been a brief explanation of Opera
tion Sea Lion.

This proposed invasion of England never took

place, but it did play a role in the German decision not to
invade Spain and Gibraltar, even after it was "postponed."
And it is because of this role that it must be considered
here.

Between the fall of France in June of 1940 and the

"postponement" of Operation Sea Lion in October of 1940 was
a period of five crucial months.

Those five months comprise

the first period to be considered below.

The even more

critical months—those eight from October, 1940, to June,
1941 —leading up to the invasion of the USSR, form the

second period to be investigated^

III

It is an axiom of military science that you can do
only so much with so many troops, that you can count on
gaining only so many goals with the power you possess.

The

proper distribution and utilization of this power is known as
economy of forces.

From June until October, 1940, the German

12
Alanbrooke, 196,

Wehrmacht was preparing for the invasion of England, Operation
Sea Lion.

It was engaged in no land combat, was fighting no

continental enemy.
control.

All of the West was conquered and under

Disregarding for the moment the reasons offered

in the foregoing chapters for Hitler's failure to invade Spain
and Gibraltar, and assuming, for the sake of investigation,
that he could have ordered simultaneous operations against
Great Britain and the Iberian Peninsula, why did Hitler
refrain from an attack upon the Iberian Peninsula during
those first five months, between June and October, 1940?
The German military position in the West for that
year has already been discussed in Chapter I, but a short
recapitulation reveals that in the^ West the Germans were
maintaining 165 divisions, with an airforce that could put
into the air 57 bomber and dive-bomber groups and 41 fighter
13
groups.

The German navy possessed ports all the way from

N o rway to Bordeaux, and the U-boats were fighting hard to
interdict English sea traffic and whittle down the British
fleet to a point that the German high-seas fleet could offer
reasonable opposition with some chance of success.

14

On

July 31, 1940, Haider noted that the Wehrmacht could control
the West with perhaps only 60 divisions (7 in Norway, 50 in
France, and 3 in Belgium and Holland) thereby freeing about

^%alder, IV, 82-3.
^"^J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War, 1939-1945
(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), p. 85.

-87120 divisions of the 180 divisions in the West and the Zone
15
of the Interior for movement elsewhere.
The destination
of those mobile forces is the most interesting part of the
entry, especially when one considers it in light of the date
the entry was made.

But that destination—the eastern

frontier—will be considered in a later chapter.

The impor

tance of the entry here is that General Haider wrote of the
strength of the Wehrmacht, a strength sufficient to allow the
withdrawal of 120 divisions from the West.

And one must add

to this that 40 more divisions were to land in England, and
were to be "highly mechanized and numerically superior to
the opposing armies."

16

General Haider presented a picture

of imposing strength in the German armed forces.
But the picture was a false one,

Haider's day-to-day

entries in his War Journal during this period give the real
picture of the German military situation as of the summer and
fall of 1940,

Speaking in terms of divisions, the German

army appeared strong.

But when one considers the woes and

worries Haider entered in his Journal for this five month
period, the true aspects of the military situation become
apparent, and the German Wehrmacht's strength as of 1940 is
seen in a different light,
1K
Haider, IV, 145,
^^Fleming, 41,

-88On July 22 Haider wrote:
less.

The war is won by us.

success is impossible."

17

"Britain's position is hope

A reversal in the prospects of

This was an inspring statement of

faith, but not a statement of fact,

for this entry was out

numbered a thousand times over by other entries that, for
example, bemoaned the fact that the tire situation was "bad,"

18
the fuel situation "very bad."

The troops, even in those

comparatively happy days were short in number and whole
divisions were needed in newly-conquered Norway and in the
new allies of Rumania and Bulgaria, as well as for duty all
19
over the West.

Some troops in the West were without

motor-transport, and had to make do with horse-drawn trains.
Eventually, whole divisions in France were without trucks
or light lorries, but dependent upon horses.
So bad was the transport situation, so short was
the Wehrmacht of trucks, tires, and fuel, that Haider on
July 26 was trying to figure out some way to get between
4,200 and 7,000 horses ashore with the first and second
waves of Operation Sea Lion.

His solution was that the

Wehrmacht had to find some way "to decrease the number of
horses" needed so desperately for transport by the proposed
invasion forces,^®

^"^Halder, IV, 126.
1Q
Ibid., V, 51.
^®Ibid., 44.
20

Ibid.. IV, 133.

-89Further entries of this type are numerous.

In the

fall of 1940, Haider wrote that the activation of General
Headquarters troops for France would have to be curtailed,
since the activation of a new SS division completely

21
deprived the Wehrmacht in the West of new trucks.

In

October, he made a long and detailed entry bewailing the
fact that the delivery of spare parts was almost non-exis
tent, that there were no maintenance non-commissioned
officers, no technicians, that they had received no tire
replacements at all, and that the troops, inadequate in
number, were burdened with construction work and had to

22
live in lean-tos and tents.
If the Wehrmacht could count divisions in three
digits, it may be asked, why was there a lack of troops?
For an insight into this problem one can turn to an entry
made by Haider in November, 1940,

It reads;

The 250,000 men (about 15 divisions) with
two months training set out in the General
Army Office estimate actually do not exist...
Military Districts have not called up enough
recruits
He went on to note that the next recruit class would not
finish its primary training until March, 1941, almost halfa-year in the future,

^^Halder, V, 23,
22
Ibid>. 21.
^'^Ibid.. 20.

II
-90In still further entries, one finds Haider trying to
figure out how to supply divisions with sorely-needed trans
port.

He finally proposed the cutting down on ammunition

trucks and the handing over of these vehicles to the divi24
sions.

That meant, of course, that in time of emergency

or even in the invasion of England the ammunition supply
would either be reduced or the transport of so vital a
commodity thrown back on more primitive means, namely, mules
and pack troops.
Again, all through the entries for this period Haider
complained of a lack of field artillery.

26
sufficient anti-aircraft artillery.

25

There was not

The army suffered

from a deficiency of reconnaissance planes.

27

Officer

personnel were short and the Wehrmacht had trouble finding

28
troops, and the Engineering units needed new officers, and
the anti-aircraft units as well were short of command per29
sonnel.
The Navy, filled with confidence, announced that it
had lost only one-third of its entire U-boat strength (28 out

^Salder, V, 20.
Ibid.. 8, 9, 33, 48, 49.
^^Ibid., IV, 180.
27

Ibid.

^^Ibid.. 182.
^®IMd.

-91of 76), and that if it were able to increase its active
strength to 120 U-boats by the Spring of 1941, it might then
30
be able to starve Britain into surrender.
Haider noted on
September 6 that 45,000 more railroad men were needed to run
the railways of the West during the invasion of England,

31

There was also a shortage of fodder for the horses depended
upon for transportation, as well as a lack of stables, veteri32
nary officers, and troops trained in horse care.
These are but a sampling of the entries made by Haider
during the first five month period under investigation.

In

the face of such facts, any evaluation of the German practice
of the economy of forces would depend upon the goals the
Germans hoped to achieve with those forces.

In other words,

assuming for the moment that the Fuehrer might have wanted
to invade the Iberian Peninsula in the summer and autumn of
1940, the period during which Operation Sea Lion was in
preparation, could he or his Wehrmacht reasonably assume
that a simultaneous operation against Spain, Portugal, and
Gibraltar was feasible from the point of view of the economy
of forces?

Could Operation Sea Lion succeed while troops

supplies, transport, fuel, and munitions were being diverted
to an action in or against Spain and Portugal.

^®Halder, IV, 184.
^^Ibid,.

186,

^^Ibid.. 230.

-92It is doubtful that these considerations would have
been answered in the affirmative.

The disparity between the

ability and the goal loomed too great to be ignored.

But it

is even more doubtful that the Fuehrer was forced to weigh
Britain against Spain and Gibraltar in terms of the economy
of forces.

As has been pointed out, in 1940 Hitler was in

control of Western Europe.

In that summer the Germans felt

that Spain was as good as "in the game" anyway.

And with

the surrender of the British government, Gibraltar would be
an automatic prize of war.
For the period from June to October, 1940, the five
months between the fall of France and the postponement of
Operation Sea Lion, the invasion and occupation of Spain and
Gibraltar was not only improbable from the viewpoint of the
eeonoray of forces, but also because there appeared to be no
need for any such action,

Spain could be "counted on," and

Gibraltar would fall like a ripe plum when the trunk of the
tree, the Home Islands, was given a good hard knock,

IV

On October 12, 1940, General Haider wrote in his
Journa1: "OKW has decided to call off 'Seeloewe' (Sea Lion)."^^
It was not until January of the next year that the "post
ponement" was made into a "change of tactics," but for all
QO

Haider, IV, 229.

-93intents and purposes Sea Lion was dead as of the middle of
October, 1940.

In his entry for October 15, Haider summar

ized the logic of the Fuehrer, the reasons Hitler gave his
officers for the cancellation of the invasion of Britain.
Fuehrer on military situation. War is won,
rest is mere question of time. Aim is to
terminate war at earliest date. Review of
preparations against British last summer.
It was a mistake. Excessive crowding of
invasion fleet (brought losses due to
British air activity). The decisive factor
was poor weather: Only five consecutive
days of clear skies were needed, but they
did not come.
The Fuehrer's statement may have sounded plausible
to some of the officers, but once again the picture is not
that presented in the official Fuehrer Conference report.
One of the main reasons the invasion never took place was
that the invasion was not a glorified river-crossing, a
35
fact the Fuehrer well knew.

The 40 divisions that were

to have gone to England in glory in mid-August had by midSeptember been cut down to 13.

The reason was simply that

the German navy did not have the wherewithall to transport
36
40 divisions to the shores of the Island.

Only with the

greatest difficulty could it secure sufficient sea transport
to ferry and land 13 divisions.

Haider, IV, 232.
^^Fleming, 47.
^^Bengston, 96.

-94But by the beginning of September, ships and barges
started to move to their embarkation points, and operational
orders for the invasion were issued on September 3,
all in vain.

It was

The Luftwaffe had failed to achieve air

superiority and to crush the British will and ability to put
up overwhelming resistance.

The final order for the invasion

could not be given.

On September 14, Hitler decided to post

pone the operation.

But the preparations for invasion went

on up to October 26, the day Haider noted its official post
ponement.

The following January Mussolini told Ciano that

in a conference with the Fuehrer he had found:
A very anti-Russian Hitler, loyal to us (Italy),
and not too definite on what he intends to do in
the future against Great Britain. In any case it
is no longer a question of landing in Great
Britain,^'
One can imagine that had Hitler pursued the invasion of
England with his characteristic vigor he might have ordered
his soldiers, if need be, to cross the Channel in rowboats,
horses and all.

But he did not, for his eyes had turned

elsewhere, toward Russia,
But what of the second period, the eight months from
October, 1940, to June 22, 1941, the date Hitler threw every
thing available into the assault on the Russian colossus?
What was the German military position during those trying
days, the same period during which Hitler and Franco met at

Ciano, 338.

-95Hendaye, during which Operation Felix was hatched and buried,
and during which Franco—much to the anger of the Fuehrerrefused to come "into the game?"
It was in this period that Hitler ordered the advance
of the Wehrmacht into rebellious Yugoslavia, into Crete,
Greece, and the vastness of North Africa.

These movements

will be considered in detail below, but suffice to say here
that they put a great strain on the Wehrmacht, and spread it
thinner than ever.

In the West, from October, 1940, until

Jane 1941, the Wehrmacht could still count divisions in three
digits.

But it had been w'eakened by the abortive invasion

preparations against Britain, and the constant drain it had
suffered in troops and materiel to the Balkans and North
Africa.
The Luftwaffe had by this time engaged the EAF in
the Battle of Britain, and on September 26 Haider had written
that the British were winning:
They (the British) still have 300 fighters
available, including 200 older types, which,
however, are more than a match for our
bombers. We have suffered considerable
losses in long-range fighters, 25-30%, with
losses in our bombers going up to 300.^8
This entry was made before the real power of the RAF had been
felt by the Luftwaffe.
infinitesimal.

In 1941, Haider's figures would seem

By October, the RAF had destroyed 1,733 German

^®Halder, IV, 209
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aircraft.

The best the Luftwaffe could ever do was to

achieve a ratio of 5-7, and that was on their brightest day
when they lost 378 aircraft and the RAF 277.

This "good"

day occurred on September 6, 1940, twenty days before
40
Haider's prophetic entry.
By the end of 1940, and even more so in the Spring
of 1941, the Gej'man losses grew.

By the beginning of 1941,

the mighty

German Luftwaffe could mount in the air only
41
some 300 serviceable fighters.
Over their eight month
period, the Luftwaffe had lost more than half of its total
42
first line strength.

And with its remaining aircraft and

pilots, the Luftwaffe during this second period had to support
German moves all the way from Crete to the Sahara to the North
Sea.
During this eight month period, 1940-1941, British
air and naval potential and real strength were growing, and
the Wehrmacht found itself hard pressed on land and on sea.
As Spain had become the "bleeding ulcer" of Napoleon, so
North Africa had become a drain on the Wehrmacht, and the
soldiers of the Afrika Korps were fighting for their lives
39
Fleming, 231.
40
Ibid.. 236.
Asher Lee, The German Air Force (New York:
& Brothers 1946), p. 85.
"^^Lee, 85.

Harper

-97by the end of the year.

The German navy, never really strong,

had by June of 1941 lost much of its high-seas strength,
including the powerful Bismarck.

The submarine war did not

progress as Doenitz had expected and as Haider had recorded
back in 1940.

England was not being starved out, and the

U-boat arm had not risen to 120 first class vessels.
It was also during this period, even as he was con
sidering the German-Spanish alliance and the capture of the
outpost of Gibraltar, that Hitler turned his eyes to the East.
As Lord Alanbrooke has said, Hitler had to break the "ring"
around hitn.

The Fuehrer had to either crush England, secure

Africa, or conquer Russia.
It can be held, then, that another reason the German
Wehrmacht failed to invade and occupy the Iberian Peninsula
was that from the early summer of 1940 until the fall of that
year it was engaged in planning Operation Sea Lion, a project
Field Marshal von Brauchitsch described as:
A frontal attack against a defence line, on
too narrow a front, with no good prospects
of surprise, and with insufficient forces
reinforced only in driblets.
From the autumn of 1940 until the early summer of 1941, the
German military machine suffered from a lack of available
forces, induced in part by the abortive invasion preparations,
43
Alanbrooke, 198.

44

Fleming, 252.

-98as well as the advance into the Balkans and the campaign in
North Africa.

It was too thinly spread, and did not care to

engage itself in yet another campaign which held out the
prospect of a long and costly war on an inhospitable terrain
against a probably strong army of foreigners to its front
and fanatic guerrillas in its rear.

And even more, the

invasion of Spain and Portugal, and the assault on Gibraltar,
would take needed troops from the Balkans, North Africa, and
the gradual buildup so painstakingly being scraped together
for the Eastern offensive.
In terms of the economy of forces, especially in the
West, the invasion of Spain and Portugal (even if it had ever
been seriously considered in this period) would have been
beyond all doubt turned down as impossible.

Spain was con

sidered to be something between an ally and a friendly
neutral, and Gibraltar, when weighed against Britain and
then Russia, was a secondary objective, an outpost.

CHAPTER V

Economy of Forces:

Eastern Front

"In Russia, Germany has started a hemorrhage
that will have incalculable consequences."
Count Galeazzo Ciano,
July 18, 1941.

I

During the first week of October, 1940, the German
ambassador to Rome, Clrich von Hassell, wrote in his diary.
As the scheduled defeat of England did not
materialize this fall, Hitler and Mussolini
are like two tigers in a cage who hurl them
selves against the bars. For the time being
they express themselves in words rather than
in deeds; fixst the one and then the other
makes new war plans.^
Hitler realized at the time that there were any number of
military moves he could make.

But he also realized that

no matter what course was adopted, it had to bring the war
to an end.

The Fuehrer had tried diplomatic negotiations

with the English during the summer and had found the Islanders
unwilling to capitulate.

Diplomacy having failed, military

methods were used, and the invasion of the British Isles ivas
prepared.

But in order to be successful, Operation Sea Lion

had to be executed with both dash and considerable military

^von Hassell Diaries, 152.
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Hitler had found that he did not possess the

necessary armed might to invade and occupy Britain.

Rather,

by the beginning of 1941 the British stood as the main enemy,
whose strength grew greater every day.
After the cancellation of Operation Sea Lion in
October, 1940, the Fuehrer took under consideration a
number of different military projects, including the pro
posed attack on the British base at Gibraltar, an attack on
Turkey,

2

and the invasion of the USSR,

Ciano wrote the next

spring (l94l) that Hitler had no precise plan of action, that
Russia, Turkey, and Spain (Gibraltar) were in his (Hitler's)
opinion only places to disperse forces, and that one could
not find the decisive engagement, the sought after "Battle
of Decision," in those outlands.

3

Ciano recorded the words

of his master, the Duce, regarding the Axis problem of where
to go and what to do;
victories.

"They (the Germans) are now sick of

They now want the victory—a victory which will

bring peace.
But the war the Fuehrer was prosecuting against the
British was not bringing peace.

Hitler found that rather

than having manoeuvered the British into a "Battle of Deci
sion," he had manoeuvered himself into a dilemma.

The

British refused to negotiate with him, the British Isles

^Haider, V, 24, 35.
^Ciano, 361.
^Ibid.

-101could not be invaded by his Wehrmacht for lack of military
strength, and the Royal Navy and the RAF were now too strong
to be defeated by inferior German naval and air forces.
Hitler possessed no means by which to beat down the enemy,
let alone invade and crush him.
But, as has already been pointed out, Hitler could
not afford to ignore the British, for their strength was
growing, especially through the aid of their American
supporters.

If he left the British alone, they would grow

steadily stronger and ultimately confront him with equal
5
or possibly superior forces, especially in the air.

Thus,

some other means had to be found, some other method to
defeat Britain,
War, someone has said, is four-fifths geography.
Hitler appreciated (as his subsequent actions proved) the
geographic problem facing him in 1940,
encircled.

The Reich was almost

Britain bounded it on the west with air and

naval might, and on the south with yet more naval and air
power, and in both directions with a growing and determined
army.

Hitler recognized that in order to dominate Europe

he had to break out of Europe, especially if he were ever
going to defeat Britain.

The very daring of Britain's

offensives in the air over Germany, in Africa, and in the
Near East caused him to think her stronger than she was,
5

Alanbrooke, 195.
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and led him to praise the British and their "toughness."

These British offensives, either political as in the Near
East or military as in Africa, caused Hitler (among other
factors) to refrain from attacking Turkey in 1940 and so
securing the oil of the Near East, and a dominating position
7
on Russia's southern flank.
The British held at least a thinly garrisoned line
from Iraq to the Shetland Islands and with their air and
naval power extended it to India and the Arctic Ocean.
Faced as he was by this geographic encirclement, the

Fuehrer

decided to move in the only direction left open to him.

On

June 22, 1941, the impatient German dictator launched his
armies in a frontal assault on the USSR.

Barred by the

tenuous ring of British power from breaking out of Europe,
he struck eastwards into the boundless plains of Russia.
On July 18, less than a month after the start of the cam
paign, Ciano wrote in his diary;

"In Russia, Germany has

started a hemorrhage that will have incalculable consequences.

II
The Fuehrer had his reasons for the attack on the
USSR.

He was not by any means ignoring the dilemma presented
Pk
Table Talks« 43.
7
Alanbrooke, 198,
®Ciano, 379.

-103him Ijy the British, and he was solving, or so he thought,
the problem of the Soviet threat to his "backdoor," the
danger of a Russian invasion of the Reich.
real, maintained Hitler.

This threat was

The Russian movements in Rumanian

Bessarabia and in eastern Poland were all part of a build
up for the attack on Germany,

As far back as the fall of

1940, the Wehrmacht had been ordered to protect the eastern
border, and by December Haider noted that he was engaged in
map operations dealing with the "line Minsk-Kiev" of the
"Eastern offensive."

9

Throughout his entries for the late

winter and spring of 1940-1941, Haider made note of Russian
military strength, transport facilities, and political situ
ations, among other things.^®

By March, the notes were of

such length and detail that one can see that the campaign
was being planned with great eare.

During the preceeding

December, the Fuehrer had ordered the training of military
interpreters—in the Russian language.

This order, dated

December 10, came only a little over a month after the
cancellation of Operation Sea Lion,^^
The motives for the Invasion were ccmplex; yet they
fitted into a pattern of logic which Hitler held and defended.
According to Haider, Hitler called the invasion an "inducement"

^Haider, V, 49.
^^Ibid.. 74, 78, 85, 87, et al.
^^Ibid.. V, 63.

VI, 1, 3, 4, 5, et al.

-104that would bring England to the point of surrender.

12

Just

before the invasion, Hitler wrote to Mussolini that "the war
against Russia is aimed at England."

13

On Sunday, March 30j 1941, the Fuehrer called a
general meeting of his military chiefs.

The topic of con

versation was the planned invasion of the USSR, and the
Fuehrer began by stating that the British had made a terrible
mistake in not taking advantage of the German peace offers
of the previous summer.

But since they had not, and since

the invasion of Britain or the defeat of their navy and air
force was not possible at that time. Hitler declared that the
Soviet Union was to be invaded and quickly occupied.

Britain,

said Hitler, based her entire hope for victory on two factors;
the United States and the Soviet Union.

The British assumed

that the former would supply Britain and also enter the war
against Germany in the not too-distant future, and that the
latter would soon declare war on Germany and present Hitler
with a second front.

Recent Anglo-Russian negotiations and

Russian military movements in the east, held the Fuehrerj
supported beyond doubt his contention that the Soviet Union
14
was preparing for an attack on the Reich,

^^Halder, V, 54.
13

Ibid., VI, 171^72,

^^Ibid.. 41-42,
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-105necessary. Hitler told Goering, to "anticipate a quick and
15
sudden stab in the back from the Soviets."
This being the situation. Hitler stated that the best
move would be to ignore the United States for the time being
and to invade and quickly crush the Soviet Union.

He held

that the United States would not be able to reach her maxi
mum war production for at least four full years and even
then would face a shipping problem.

Also, there was strong

agitation in the U. S, against entering another European
war.

As for the Soviet Union, the Fuehrer simply stated;
Only the final and drastic solution of all
land problems will enable us to accomplish
within two years our tasks in the air and
on the ocean (defeat of the Royal Navy and
RAF), with the manpower and material resources
at our disposal,^®

Hitler's motives for the invasion of the Soviet Union could
thus be given as:

a desire to attack Russia before she

attacked him; the wish to deprive Great Britain of one of
her remaining diplomatic-military weapons, i.e., the threat
to Germany of a two front war with the Russians forming the
new front; the "clash of ideologies" as propounded by Hitler;
and

the desire to gain living space for Germany's surplus

population and to extend his New Order over the rich lands
of Eastern Europe.

The oil of south Russia and the agri

culture of the Ukraine would have been great boons to the
1^

Shulman, 56»

^^Ibid.

-106German war effort against Britain when the time for the
drive West came once again.
This was his plan.

Taetically, it was well thought

out and the Fuehrer believed in its success.

Intelligence

reports, as recorded by Haider, showed the Russians to be
defeatable; that they would fall, even though they resisted,
before the might of a summer blitzkrieg.

As Hitler once

stated before the war, "I shall advance (toward world con,
quest) step by step.

Never two steps at once."

17

The

strategy of Russia first and Great Britain second did make
sense—but only if Russia could be defeated in a lightning
summer campaign and only if the U. S. A. did take four years
to get it production up to an important wartime level, and
only if the British did not succeed in becoming too powerful
in the air and on the sea.
Shortly after the invasion of the Soviet Unionj the
Russian armies west of the Dvina and the Dnieper had been
scattered.

Soviet forces were reeling under the impact of

the German blow.

Haider wrote with genuine sincerity:

It is probably no overstatement to say that
the Russian campaign had been won in the
space of two weeks. Of course, this does
not yet mean that it is closed. The sheer
geographical vastness of the country and
the stubbornness of the resistance, which
is carried on with all means, will claim our
efforts for many more weeks to come.^®
1^

York:

Hermann Rausehning, The Voice of Destruction (New
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940) p. 28.
^®Halder, VI, 196.

-107Those "weeks to come" mentioned by Haider turned
into months and then into years.
'Vron."

And the campaign was never

Yet at that time the general had good reason, tacti

cally if not strategically, to feel that he was making a
factual statement of truth.

For it indeed appeared that the

Russians were beaten and that by fall the occupation of the
Soviet Union would be well under way.

Then, of course, by

the spring or perhaps the summer of 1942, the greatly expanded
and stronger Reich could commence its campaign against the
all-but-beaten British.

Their last remaining hope, the United

States, would still be two or three years away from a war
production level of importance, and would undoubtedly be
overawed at seeing German troops and guns in eastern Siberia
opposite the Alaskan coast.

Such a situation, combined

with the powerful Japanese threat in the Pacific» would be
enough to keep the Americans from entering the war.

And

Great Britain would stand alone.

Ill

The two periods of the first year of the war in the
West, June to October of 1940 and October, 1940, to June,
1941, have already been discussed (see Chapter IV).

The

reasons for the German failure to invade Spain and Gibral
tar for those thirteen months have been set forth.

The

next "period", that from June, 1941, to the Allied inva
sion of France in 1944, is of interest in so far as it

illustrated the factors affecting the German decision not
to invade Spain and Gibraltar during those years.
Due to the opening of the Eastern Front in June,
1941J and the military diversion in the Balkans just before
it J the possibility of conducting any campaign on the Iberian
Peninsula was all but nil.

Hitler ordered that the war in

the West could be carried on in so far as necessary to pro
tect the continent from invasion or to drive the British
out of Africa, but it was the war in the East in which he
hoped to win the "Battle of Decision."

It was in the East,

felt flitlerj that the war would be won or lost.
And it was in the East that the Fuehrer made his
greatest effort.

By the end of 1942, troops and supplies

were going mainly to Russia.

Rommelp commanding the German

forc©s in Africa, felt the lack of troops and supplies to
19
be the main factor in his defeat.

For the great bulk of

German men and material was going Eastj into "Moloch

Russia."

The attack on the Soviet Union, known as Operation
Barbarossa, was first scheduled to take place on May 15,
1941,

20

The Wehrmacht was on that day to begin the destruc

tion of Soviet armed forces, to occupy the land, and to
"crush and annihilate" the Communist government and ideology.
But the attack did not take place on May 15.
1Q

It had to be

Rommel, p. 280, 318, 360, 363-4, 484, 487.

^^Bengtson, 72.

-109postponed for over a month because of the unexpected Balkan
campaign J the result of the Duce's meddling in Albania and
Greece.
Mussolini had earlier informed the Fuehrer that he
was going to fight a

"parallel War."

By this he meant that

Italy would fight the same enemies as the Reichs, but without
closely connecting her actions to those of the Wehrmacht.
On October 19, 1940, the Duce wrote Hitler to inform him
that Italy planned to launch an attack on Greece.

The

Fuehrer was at this time in France, on his way to Hendaye
for the conference with Franco on the 23rd.
the Duce's letter caught up with him.
pleased.

On the 24th

Hitler was not

He did not want the Balkans disturbed and he

feared a British invasion of the Greek islands^ particu
larly of Leainos s from which bombers could reach the Rumanian
oil fields.

He quickly travelled to Florence where he tried

to dissuade the Duce from the invasion.

Mussolini, delighted

with his trick and the fact that for once the Fuehrer was
begging him for something, reported to Hitler that the
operation had begun and could not be stopped.

General Jodlj

who was traveling with the Fuehrer, said "we arrived just a
few hours too late,"

21

Hitler, of course, was vexed, and Mussolini soon
realized that he had committed a blunder.

The Greeks

^^Admiral Raymond DeBelot, The Struggle for the
Mediterranean 1939-1945 (Princeton, N, J.s
Princeton
University Press, 1951). p. 77

-110actually drove the Italians back across the Albanian border
at many points.

By December of 1940, the Italians were in

such a state that Mussolini told Ciano:
There is nothing else to do«
This is
grotesque and absurd, but it is a fact.
We have to ask for a truce (with the
Greeks) through Hitler.^^
Ciano wrote that the shame was almost too much.

"I would

rather," he said, "put a bullet through my head than telephone Ribbentropi"

23

At this same time, Yugoslavia approached the Italians
with the offer of an alliance.

Hitler, who had been con

cerned over the failure of the Italians in Greece, changed
his mood when Rome informed him of the possibility of an
alliance with the government in Belgrade.

Although the

Italians had appealed in December, 1940, for German inter
vention—^diplomatic or military—the Fuehrer had then
24
informed them that he could do nothing until March.
But
now he responded to that appeal and planned an attack on
Greece through his new allies of Rumania and Bulgaria while
Yugoslavia remained passive.

The alliance with Belgrade

was successfully concluded, and on March 25, 1941, Yugo
slavia joined the Axis.

On the very next day, March 26,

General Simovic and his anti-fascist followers brought

^^Ciano, 318.
Ibid.
^^Ibid«, 326.

-111off a coup d'etat in Belgrade; in Hitler's opinion this
meant that Yugoslavia did not intend to abide by her oneday old alliance with the Axis.

He decided, without even

waiting to be contacted by the new government in Belgrade,
to liquidate Yugoslavia,

Labeled Operation Marita, this

action had been in preparation for some months and had as
its objective the defeat and occupation of Greece,
now quickly expanded to include Yugoslavia.
6, 1941, Hitler struck without warning.

It was

Thus, on

April

German troops that

had been amassed in the east for the Russian offensive were
ordered to strike to the south.
The war in the Balkans was one of speed, a blitz
krieg.

The Greeks were unable to stop the German advance,

even with the aid of the British who sent some troops from
North Africa.

By April 19, the king in Athens recognized

the hopelessness of the situation and ordered the Greeks
to aid the British in their evacuation.

By the 27th the

entire mainland was in German or Italian hands. Yugoslavia
had capitulated on the 17th,

Only Crete remained, and it

was taken in a savage battle the last week in May, after
heavy expenditure of Luftwaffe aircraft and paratroops.
In two months it was all over.
The Balkan campaign is Important because it delayed
the start of Operation Barbarossa and placed a great strain
on the already thinly-spread Wehrmacht,

Although the

fighting had been brief and successful, many of the divisions
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diverted to the Balkan peninsula had to be moved back to
their original jumping-off places for Operation Barbarossa,
This movement itself took a great toll of fuel and equip25
ment.

And the troops, after two months of battle, were

now to be thrown into the vastness of Russia, because there
26
were not enough reserves to relieve them.
Many of the
Panzer units needed a thorough overhaul and partial reequipment after their battles and long treks over the Greek
27
mountains.

But even more, the Balkan campaign took troops

from all over Europe, especially in the East, and rendered
the possibility of any action in the West out of the ques
tion.

It weakened the Wehrmacht.

Haider best stated the

situation in his entry for April 5 in which he wrote that
the conduct of the campaign was dictated by;
political considerations, and what is more,
considerations of a purely transitory
character. This precludes any planning
with clear goals and harbors the danger
of dissipating our strength in a series
of isolated operations,

IV

The German Wehrmacht was dissipating its strengths
As early as June, 1940, before the proposed invasion of
Haider, VI, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 130.
26
Seymour Feidin and William Richardson (ed.) The
Fatal Decisions (New York; William Sloan and Associates,
1956> p. 43.
27
Haider, VI, 134-6,
28-,., . J

_„

Ibid., 53,

-113England, it was obvious that the German military suffered
from a critical lack of siege artillery, motorized trans
port, tracked vehicles, command unity, and respect for the
combative will of other peoples.

As was shown (see Chapter

IV), the Wehrmacht in 1940-1941 was in no position in terms
of men and materiel to invade Great Britain, let alone en
gage in a simultaneous operation on the Iberian Peninsula.
With the beginning of the Russian campaign in June, and even
before when the 'Wehrmacht moved into the Balkans in April,
the supply and manpower situation was such that to have en
gaged in a campaign on the Iberian peninsula was impossible.
According to Haider, the Wehrmacht found itself
"extremely weak when compared with the
March 25, 1941.

Russians"

29

on

It was his belief that the divisions would

arrive in the East in such numbers as to eliminate "all
danger."

But when the date for the invasion came, the

Wehrmacht could count only 141 German divisions matched
30
against 213 Russian divisionso

This tremendous superiority

of numbers in the Russian forces seemed to cause the Wehr
macht no great concern.

According to Generals Bodenschatz

and Milch the Luftwaffe was not prepared for the Russian
31
war—and would not have been ready until 1943 or 1944.
29
Haider, VI, 35,
^^Ibid.. 160
31
Bartz, 103.

-114In November, 1940, after the cancellation of Sea Lion,
German troops were withdrawn from the West and sent to
Rumania.

Haider noted that upwards of 10 divisions left

32
for the East.

A little later he wrote that the diversion

of military strength to outlying areas was going to restrict
33
any major campaign.

This, of course, was obvious, and

was one reason why an invasion of Spain never took place.
The Balkan campaign, served as an examples of this "diver
sion," and was not approved of by Halderi
Other signs of the Wehrmacht's material strain were
evident.

For example, about 500 planes were used by the

Luftwaffe in the conquest of Crete.
damaged and 130 destroyed.

Of these 250 were

When the invasion of the Soviet

Union began one month later, the Luftwaffe eould put into
34
the air 320 planes for Operation Barbarossa,

In other

words, the invasion of the little island of Crete received
more air support than did the invasion of the Soviet Union
in the initial stage.

The reason, in part, was that para

troops were used on Crete.

And the parachute divisions of

the Luftwaffe had suffered high casualties as well, so high
that the invasion of Crete was the last big paratroop opera35
tlon on the part of the Wehrmacht in the war.
^^alder, V, 21.
^^Ibid.. 43.
^^Ibid.. YI, 142,
^^Ibid., 35, 37.

-115All in all, the Wehrmacht in 1941 did not possess
the ability to invade Russia with the force that it had
used against Poland two years before, let alone conduct a
simultaneous peninsular campaign.

It was charged with

garrisoning and defending Europe from the north of Norway
to the south of France, thence east to the Greek Islands
and north to the forests of Finland,
Africa and in Russia.

In terms of the economy of forces,

it was simply too much.
campaign against

It was fighting in

To add to all of this a peninsular

Spanish and possibly British forces would

have been catastrophic, as was clearly evident to the Wehr
macht and to the Fuehrer.

The pet project of Admiral Raeder

(the drive through Spain, across North Africa, over the Suez,
and into the Near East) was flatly turned down by the Fuehrer
in 1941.

According to Alan Bullock;

he (Raeder) soon came to realize and later
admitted that Hitler was not interested in
a major offensive in the southern theater,
that he had no intention of diverting suf
ficient forces away from his proposed
Russian campaign to be able to achieve any
thing effective in this area.^®
By 1942, Rommel was fighting desperately in North
Africa, yet he never received enough men and materiel to
give him an equal chance of success against the British,
In order to aid Rommel, the capture of Malta, the British
strong-point in the central Mediterranean, was necessary,

^^Bullock, 551.
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But by 1942 it was too late for such an attack, for the
Luftwaffe had been absorbed by the requirements of the Eastern
37
Front.

In April, 1942, Kesselring had to announce that the

pressure on the Russian Front forced the OKW to withdraw a
38
large portion of the Luftwaffe units based in Sicily.
And
perhaps most striking of all, the OKW had recognized the
problem even as it was developing, and had announced back
in February of 1941 that:;

"It is clear that in view of

Operations Marita and Barbarossa the troops held in reserve
for Operation Felix will have to be used in the new under
takings.'*^^
In considering the years after 1942, i.e.j, during
the great Soviet offensives of '43 and '44, it is unnecessary
to explain the German inability to muster sufficient forces
and materiel for a campaign in the Iberian peninsula.

It is

common knowledge that the Fuehrer did not possess enough
men and materiel to fight on his existing fronts, let alone
on a new one.
Thus, Ciano was right.

In attacking the Soviet Union

Hitler had indeed opened "a hemorrhage of incalculable conse
quences."

And with that "hemorrhage" and the months of

preparation and diversion before it, there existed another

^"^DeBelot, 157.
^®Ibld.
^®IMd.
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reason not to invade the Iberian peninsula.
best be stated Economy of Forces;

That reason can

Eastern Front.

CHAPTER VI

Economy of Forcesr

Southern Front

"No longer (in 1943) could we carry the burden
of three fronts. ...Only with great difficulty
and by using our last reserves have we been
able to improvise new fronts, both east'^and
west. The sky over Germany has grown very
dark."
Erwin Rommel,
writing on the economy
of forces. Summer of 1944,

In 1939-40, the British government became concerned
over the expansionist policies of Mussolini and the creation
of a potent Italian navy and air force.

This concern had

existed in London for some time, but by 1940 the problem had
reached such a degree that there existed a threat of an armed
division of the Mediterranean into two parts, if the Italians
so willed.

The Mediterranean would then no longer be an arm

of the Atlantic and an avenue of British policy.

Indeed, it

was feared that it might become an Italian lake.
The British had attempted to prepare for such an event,
By 1940, their military strength in North Africa and the Near
East was not great, but was at least recognizable.

In June

of that year, the British army counted 36,000 men in Egypt,
27,000 in Palestine, 9,000 in the Sudan, 8,500 in Kenya, and

-1191,500 in Somaliland,^

Obviously, these forces did not possess

the strength necessary to wage an African war.

All these

forces were without much heavy equipment, no formation was
completely outfitted, and their weakness in anti-aircraft
and anti-tank armament was serious.

The Royal Air Force in

North Africa and the Near East had only about a hundred
machines of obsolete types, and another hundred planes of
2
more serviceable character.

Despite this materiel weakness,

however, the British forces in the summer of 1940 were ready
and willing to fight their new enemy, the Italians.
The most potent British strength in the Mediterranean
and Near East in 1940 was provided by the Royal Navy.

In

aircraft carriers and battleships, the British were superior
to their enemies, although the Axis at that time possessed
a slight lead in escort and small battle craft.

In the

Mediterranean there were two British aircraft carriers, five
battleships, one battle cruiser, five light cruisers, two
destroyer flotillas, and eight submarines.

Although the sea

was seriously threatened by the Italians, the Mediterranean
3
was still for the most part in British hands.
This seems all the more remarkable when one remembers
the multiplicity of dangers which faced the British in that

^Raymond DeBelot, The Struggle for the Mediterranean,
1939-1945 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,
1951) p. 60.
^Ibid.
3
Alanbrooke, 194-6.

See also DeBelot, 61,

-120summer of 1940.
fronts:"^

They had to wage war on three separate

on the oceans in defense of their trade routes, in

the Channel to protect the home Islands against a threatened
invasion, and in the Mediterranean, where they were outnumbered
by the Italians on land, on sea, and in the air (see Chapter
I),

Although the immediate dangers on the Channel and ocean

fronts were the most pressing, loss of the Mediterranean
would have been in the long run hardly less fatal.

The

British knew this, and thus did what they could to prepare
for the defense of the area.
But, by the end of June, 1940, after the fall of
France and during the height of German preparations for
Operation Sea Lion, the British position in the Mediterranean
area did not appear to be very good.

The threat of invasion

of the home islands served to deplete the Medxterranean
fleets, and Lord Alanbrooke wrote;
.,,Malta was left an isolated outpost.and
Gibraltar was dominated by the guns of Franco's
Spain, It was scarecely surprising that most
of the American Service Chiefs regarded
Britain at this time as a bad risk. The
French High Command (in Vichy).predicted
that within three weeks Britain's neck would
be 'wrung like a chicken's®.
The British were, however, just as Hitler had once
said, **tough".

The Eastern Mediterranean Fleet, under the

command of Admiral Andrew Cunningham, was able to establish

'^Alanbrooke, 150.

-121from the very start of the war such a "moral ascendancy"

5

over the Italian sea forces that, despite their central
position and naval air power, the Italians were unable to
prevent the British from holding Malta and even passing
occasional convoys through the Sicilian Narrows to reinforce
Egypt and reassure Greece and Turkey.

The German navy at the

outbreak of the war was in no way capable of challenging the
British control of the Mediterranean,

Owing to their great

numerical inferiority, German surface forces could not hope
to penetrate the Mediterranean, and the German submarines
were fully occupied in the Atlantic,

II

In November, 1940, the Italians struck at Greece
across the Adriatic (see Chapter V),

Cunningham was able

not only to protect the Greek archipelago and islands from
immediate Italian invasion, but also to launch torpedocarrying aircraft against the Italian fleet in Taranto
harbor

and thus sink or immobilize three of Italy's six

battleships.

The balance of sea power in the Mediterranean

was transformed in the course of a single night.
A month later Marshal Graziani, furiously prodded by
the impatient Duce, began to move eastward with his long,
strung-out battle army of nearly a quarter of a million men

^Alanbrooke, 150.

-122to occupy Alexandria and thus deprive the British navy of its
base.

''Never," wrote Ciano of his country's generals and

their reluctance to advance against the British, "has a
military operation been undertaken so much against the will
of the commanders."

6

General O'Connor, backed by the daring

and ability of a few RAF squadrons, fell on the Italian
advance guard at Sidi Barrani, and with one weak armored
division recently arrived from England and a single Indian
infantry division proceeded to destroy the Italian advance
forces and drive back the invasion.

At the same time General

Wavell launched his attack upon the Italians in Eritrea and
Abyssinia.
The attacking Italian forces under Marshall Graziani
were quickly checked and forced to retreat.

The troops under

O'Connor had more trouble trying to keep up with the routed
Fascists than in fighting them.

In a campaign conducted five

to six hundred miles from his base and sustained by captured
enemy transport, O'Connor overwhelmed the Italians in
Cyrenaica and parts of the middle Libyan plain.

The Italian

7
African army of 341,000 men reeled under the impact of the
British coimter-offensive.

And although the opportunity

afforded by this tremendous campaign—of driving on to
Tripoli and, by securing air bases, of restoring Britain's

®Ciano, 291.
7
Rommel, 91.

-123control of the central Mediterranean—was subsequently thrown
away in order to send an expeditionary force to Greece (see
Chapters I, II, and V), its Impact and that of Cunningham's
naval victories had a profound

effect on not only Italian
8
morale, but on Turkish and Spanish opinion as well.
At an early date in the war the German Wehrmacht

had made an offer, with certain selfish conditions attached
9
to it, to send forces to the Mediterranean theater.

In

Directive No. 18 of November 12, 1940, (the same Directive
ordering the preparation of Operation Felix) Hitler stateds
Intervention of German forces is not envisaged
(in Africa) until after the Italians reach
Mersa Matruh. Even then the Luftwaffe will
be employed only if the Italians place the
necessary bases at our disposal.
The Fuehrer ordered that the ffehrmacht hold one armored divi
sion in readiness for transport to North Africa, and ordered
the navy and the Luftwaffe to prepare for transport duties,
and the bombing of the Suez respectively.

Haider noted on

November 14, two days after the Directive was issued, that
the Third Armored Divisdon "will continue to stand by for
Libya."
Q
Alanbrooke, 197,
^DeBelot, 93,
l^Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI, 960.
llHalder, V, 21.

-124The Italians wished to restrict German assistance to
the shipment of supplies.

They were at that time yet to feel

the crushing weight of O'Connor's counter-offensive.
lini stated:
go home,"

12

Musso

"If the Germans ever get here, they will never
He had by this time begun to realize that he was

no longer an equal partner in this alliance and on his instruc
tions Badoglio had refused Keitel's offer to send self-con13
tained German units to Africa.

But by the time O'Connor

had captured 130,000 Italian prisoners, 400 tanks and 850
guns, and had driven the Duce's forces all the way back to
the middle of Libya, Mussolini was not only forced to accept
but actually had to beg for help from Hitler at a time when
assistance would like rescue—which it most assuredly was.

Ill

In his diary entry for December 21, 1940, Ciano
noted that the Germans were then considering the Italian
position and the request for assistance.

He wrote that two

armored divisions were proposed as the forces to be sent to
14
Libya.

General Haider noted two days later in his War

Journal that Italy was to receive raw materials and arms
15
for two divisions. On December 24 he wrote that the

l^DeBelot, 93.
^^Ibid.
^'^Ciano, 326.
1

Haider, V, 80.

-125beleaguered Italians were making "insane demands for arms,"

16

Haider felt that the Wehrmaeht, even in those happy days of
1940, did not possess the materiel strength to meet the
"insane" Italian demands.

On January 16, he wrote that the

Wehrmaeht was having "difficulties" securing armored reeon17
naissance ears for Libya.

These vehicles, he noted, would

be ready by February 10 at the very earliest.

Once again

the lack of wheeled and tracked transport in the German army
was evident.
During December, 1940, and January, 1941, the

Tenth

German Air Fleet, known to the Italians as "X Gat" (Corpo
aero tedesco), moved into Italy and was stationed on the
airfield of Reggio Calabria, and on the Sicilian airfields
at Catonia, Comiso, Trapani, and Palermo.

This force possessed

a strength of about four hundred aircraft, including ME 110's

18

and Stuka dive-bombers.
were added.

In March of 1941 some Heinkel Ill's

The Tenth Air Fleet, however, had no torpedo

planes, a fact which was to prove disadvantagious to the Axis
and a boon to the Royal Navy.
At last. In January, 1941, the Fuehrer decided to move
military forces to Libya to aid the Italians and to stabilize
the situation.

These forces were to be kept comparatively

^®Halder, V, 83.
^''^Ibid.. 85.
^®DeBelot, 94.

-126small in size so as to avoid placing too great a strain on
the Wehrmacht and weakening its build-up for the coming
Eastern offensive.

Only two divisions and one Panzer regi

ment were to be sent.

Haider wrote on January 20 that

General Funck was to be the commander of the African forces
of the Wehrmacht, and that those forces were to leave by
19
February IGth, with their supplies going ahead of them.
By February 27, the British encountered their first opposi
tion from German patrols on the Libyan desert.

It very

quickly became obvious that the Germans of the Afrika Korps
were of quite a different character than the Italians.
It appears that Haider was wrong when he wrote that
General Funck would command the German forces in Libya.
Rommel wrote that he was instructed on February 6 by Field
Marshal von Brauchitsch to take command of the German Afrika
Korps, and that he was "to move off as soon as possible to
20
Libya to reconnoitre the situation,"
The middle of
February, according to Rommel, saw the first arrival of
German troops in Africa—the Fifth Light Division—and by
mid-April all troops of that divisioawere in Africa.

By

March 11, the Fifth Panzer Regiment had completed its dis
embarkation at Tripoli, and the Fifteenth Panzer Division
was move in toto by mid-May,
19
Haider, V, 89.

20

Rommel, 98.
Ibid*

-127On March 31, Ronunel hegan his advance against the
British.

Although he himself called it "the raid through

Gyrenaica," the Axis offensive in Libya in 1941 is often
called "Rommel's first offensive."

Erwin Eommel, who was

in command of the German-Italian forces in Libya, was under
the orders of General Gariboldi of the Italian Commando
Supremo in Borne.

According to a written agreement between

Italy and Germany, Rommel could appeal to the OKW in the
event that the instructions received from the Italians were
unacceptable.

But in Libya Rommel's personality soon came

to be the dominant factor, not only with the Germans and
Italians, but with the British as well.

Rommel was person

ally popular with Hitler—he was the Fuehrer's "general in
the sun."

He rapidly gained overriding influence in Axis

councils and frequently bypassed his Italian commanders by
dealing directly with the OKW,

After the first successes,

namely the drive through Cyrenaica all the way to Solium
on the Egyptian-Libyan border, nothing could stand against
his influence.
Thus, the term "Rommel's offensive" is in fact
justified, for without Rommel there would have most likely
been no offensive.

And it was that offensive that served

to turn the African war into a major campaign for the
Wehrmacht, a third front to be fought for and on which to
spend and even squander men and precious material.

It was

-128tlie African campaign that served as another factor in the
German decision not to invade the Iherian Peninsula.
By May, 1941, the German Wehrmacht was engaged in a
full-scale drive to conquer Africa, with over 30,000 men and
hundreds of tanks, to say nothing of the Tenth Air Fleet in
Italy and Sicily and subordinate Luftwaffe units in Africa.
By November the African Campaign had taken on such propor
tions that the OKW was forced to regard it as a major front.

IV

Just as in Operation Sea Lion the previous fall, the
transport situation in the spring of 1941 was very critical,
especially sea transport.

According to Haider six German

ships were needed to transport supplies to the Italians

22

alone during January.

By the 2l3t of that month the

German railway service was running twelve trains a day over
the Brenner Pass to Maples, but the navy could only handle
six a day.

Thus, wrote Haider, since 110 train loads of

Afrika Korps supplies were to be ferried across, the ItalianGerman convoys would require at least 45 days to load and
unload, to say nothing of the time required to cross the sea.
But the most interesting aspect of all the War Journal
entries for this period. Spring, 1941, is that while Haider
lamented the shortage of transport and supplies for Eommel,

^^Halder, V, 86.
^^Ibid.. 91.

-129he spent a great deal more time noting the preparations for
the coming invasion of the USSR, and from April to May the
"Blitzkrieg" in the Balkans.

In other words, with the coming

of June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht found itself engaged (as
planned) with the Russians, occupying the recently conquered
Balkans (unplanned), and conducting a major campaign (unplanned)
in the south under Rommel.

This latter front, as Rommel

himself bitterly complained, was ignored as much as possible
by the OKW and OKH;
I was not very happy at the efforts of Field
Marshal von Brauchitsch and Colonel-General
Franz Haider to keep down the numbers of
troops sent to Africa and to leave the future
of this theatre of war to c h a n c e ,
On November 7-8, 1942, Operation Torch—the Allied
invasion of North Africa—began.

Units of the United States

Army, Navy, and Air Force, together with British troops
supported by the RAF, landed simultaneously at numerous
points on the North African coast.

So gigantic was the

Allied invasion that it was transported in a convoy of 500
25
ships and escorted by 350 more.

The invasion was, of

course, a serious threat to the Axis position in Libya.

Not

only would Rommel have to fight the British to the east, but
now also the Americans to the west.

^^Rommel, 106.
25
Chronology of the Second World War, (London:
Institute of International Affairs, 1947.) p. 151.

Royal

-130With the greatest effort, and by stripping many
occupation garrisons to the absolute minimum, reserves were
sent to Africa.

Gn November 9 German troops began arriving

at El Aouana airport outside of funis.

It is to the credit

of the German Luftwaffe that this rapid and surprising
reinforcement took place.

Troop-carrying aircraft flew

constantly between the continent and Tunis.

At its peak

26
the airlift was bringing in 1,000 men or more a day.
But
once again the tremendous efforts of the German military
were in vain.

The number of troops brought to Africa was

not large enough to counter the overwhelming superiority of
the Allies.

And supplies, so critically needed, remained

as short as ever.
And what is more, with the Allied invasion of North
Africa the Nazis discarded the Vichy regime and Vichy-France
was occupied by German troops on November 11, placing yet
another burden on a weakened and faltering Wehrmacht.

The

end of 1942 saw the German military machine fighting for its
life in the south, attempting to crush growing resistance
movements in the Balkans and in the West, and in the East
feverishly preparing for the catastrophic winter of 1942-43,
the winter of Stalingrad.
The history of the Afrika Korps and its defeat at
the hands of the Anglo-American forces in 1942-43 is beyond

2®Fuller, 243.

-131the scope of this thesis.

Suffice it to say that the war in

Africa served as a further tax on the

Wehrmacht's strength,

as well as a further reason not to attempt an invasion and
occupation of the Itoerian Peninsula.

As in the case of the

West (Chapter IV) and the East (Chapter V), the Wehrmacht
did not have the necessary men, transport, nor supplies to
sustain its existing fronts, much less a new one.
Rommel held that one of the main, if not the main,
reasons that Africa fell to the

Allies was the lack of

materiel and fresh reserves of troops.

By the end of 1941

he was writing of convoys that never came

27

and Allied

aircraft that flew unopposed—-for the Luftwaffe, as shown in
Chapter V, "had been absorbed by the Eastern Front,"

28

Rommel

himself best summed up the situation:
Anyone who has to fxght, even wxth the most
modern weapons, against an enemy in complete
command of the air, fights like a savage
against modern European troops, under the
same handicaps and with the same chances of
success,^®
How can one fight a war with one eye on the enemy
and the other on the gas gauge?

This, of course, was another

of Rommel's supply problems, and one that he lamented most
30
bitterly.

So bad was the German position in Africa, so

27
Rommel, 234, 521, 287.
28
DeBelot, 157,
29
Rommel, 285.
Ibid., 333, 354-5, 278-9, 280.

-132short were the numbers of men and sorely needed supplies,
that a saddened Rommel wrote just before his death in 1944;
Colonel-General Haider told me in 1941 that
the Army High Command regarded North Africa
as a lost cause and that they were setting
the German troops no other task but to
delay the collapse of Italian resistance
in Libya for as long as possible. Herr
Haider asserted.•.that it would be impos
sible to keep an army of more than two or
three divisions supplies in North Africa
for long.31
Thus, the war in Africa served as another drain on
a bleeding Wehrmacht, or in a more mundane context, its
"ulcer," just as the Peninsular War of 1809-12 was
Napoleon's, North Africa was the "ignored" front, and yet
it too took away men and materiel.

It too made an invasion

of the Iberian Peninsula out of the question, for the
Wehrmacht knew that such an invasion would be still-born in
the light of the Economy of Forces;

Southern Ftont.

CHAPTER VII

Zuruckblicken

"Thou Shalt make casteIs than in Spayne,
And dreme of joye, al but in vayne,"
Goeffrey Chaucer,
Romaunt of the Rose. B. 1,,
2573.

I

In his work Chief of Intelligence« Ian Colvin gives
what is perhaps the best statement of the problem, and the
answers to it, that make up this thesis;
On the white cliffs of Dover, the sands of
El.Alamein, and the banks of the Volga at
Stalingrad there are monuments to three turn
ing pbints of the Second World War, where
the flood of Hitler's fire and steel was
stemmed and turned back. But if our grand
children ask why it was that Hitler stopped
at the Pyrenees and how Spain remained neutral
against all historical likelihood, there is
no simple answer that we can give them.l
There is no simple answer.

Why Hitler did not invade

Spain, and with it the strategic bastion of Gibraltar, can
not be explained with one or two or even several well
constructed reasons.

The answers put forth in this thesis

are not offered as the only 'or the complete explanations
to that question.

Rather, the major factors which helped

^Colvin, 124,

-134shape the German decision are given here in what might be
called points of consideration, aspects of research that
offer some insight into one of the most enigmatic turning
points of the war.
What are these factors, these "aspects" of research?
Why did the Germans not strike against Spain?

Military

scientists and historians may conclude that Hermann Goering
was correct in stating that the failure of the Wehrmacht
to do so was perhaps the most fatal blunder of the war.
But, despite all the gains that were calculated to result
from such a campaign (see Chapter l), the prospect offered
too many deterrents and too many grave risks.
was the awful specter of a peninsular war.

First there

With the British

strong enough, and fervent enough, to fight in Norway, Greece,
and Africa it could not be doubted that they would intervene
in any action on the Iberian peninsula, especially since that
action would be a direct threat to Gibraltar.

British suc

cesses in Africa proved only too well their ability to make
such intervention harmful to a thinly-spread Wehrmacht.
Then there was the added factor of Spanish resistance,
or more correctly, guerilla warfare.

The Wehrmacht would

have had to assume the enormous additional responsibility of
occupying the Iberian peninsula with its long, jagged coast
line,

It simultaneously would have had to fight the British

and suppress the Spaniards,

The appearance of Naszi forces

-135would have quickly set off nation-wide explosions in a country
rife with hatreds and superlatively skilled in the art of
guerilla warfare.
Nor would the task of seizing and occupying Spain
have been an easy one.

Transportation would have been a grave

problem, for Spanish railroads were of different gauge from
the French, were badly disorganized, and rolling stock was

2

scarce and antiquated.

The Irun bridge, which was of such

concern to Haider, was a good example of the tremendous
transport problem.
The supplying of the invading forces would have been
another difficult matter, as there was not enough food in
Spain to allow an occupying army to live off the land, and
lines of supply from France to the north, which could pass
through the Pyrenees at only a few well known points (see
Chapter II) would have been easy targets for guerilla units
3
or British bombers.

Thus, the prospect of a long and bloody

peninsular war may be said to stand as one factor upon which
the decision not to invade Spain was taken.
Another factor is that of the "faQade"-=>the ideological
edifice that Hitler would have preserved.

Closely connected

with this was his personal liking for the Spanish people,
his desire, simply stated, not to offend them.

The Fuehrer

2
United States Department of State, Documents on German
Foreign Policy, series D (Washington D, C,; United States
Government Printing Office, 1957), Vol, X, p. 444-5,

3

Ibid.
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by another would bring the whole concept crashing round his
ears, and he did everything possible to avoid such a catas
trophe,

When Italy left the war in 1943, for example,

Hitler ordered that Mussolini be rescued and established
as the ruler of fascist North Italy.

Hitler could not,

he would not, allow his grand ideological fagade to be
destroyed.

Spain's prestige with the Fuehrer, his genuine

liking of the "Nordic" Spaniards, only strengthened his
conviction that such an invasion would be a danger to and
in complete contradiction of the entire concept of the
New Order.
Spain was fascist, but also neutral.

Hitler the

politician recognized the danger that such an invasion would
bring.

He knew that he could not afford to panic Turkey

into a dependence on Russia or England, and feared that the
invasion of a neutral state after two or more years of war
might cause ore-rich Sweden to adopt a hostile attitude.
Whether or not Turkey and Sweden would have viewed such an
invasion with alarm is difficult to say.
felt that he could not risk it.

But the Fuehrer

Nor could he risk the

alarming of his newly won "allies"; Bulgaria, Hungary,
Rumania, the strife-torn Czechoslovakia, Finland, and the
subservient but still potentially powerful Vichy-France.
Hitler needed their space and their manpower, their oil and
their industry.

He did not want to see his organized Europe
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He did not want his "allies"

to possess any attitude but one of affability, tempered
with respect.

He could not afford to be bothered with

revolts and the noxious problems that would result, espe
cially that of occupation.

And he liked the Spaniards'.

The above reasons or explanations are theoretical.
We do not know that England would have intervened on the
Iberian peninsula had the Wehrmacht launched an offensive
across the Pyrenees.

We only have Churchill's order that

the Combined Chiefs of Staff "consider the possibility of
alternative action on the Iberian peninsula."

4

It cannot be held that Hitler's "liking" of the
Spanish people alone would have stayed his hand.

After

all, he said that he liked the Greeks, admired them, and
yet he invaded Greece,

We cannot say that Spain would

have resisted an invasion by Germany, especially before
1943, but we have Hitler's words that "they (the Spanish
5
people)...would carry on guerrilla war(fare) in our rear."
All these answers may not be factually or historically
correct, but they are important.

For it was the thinking

of the Fuehrer that decided the Iberian issue as it was his
decision to make.

4
Alanbrooke, 339.

5

Martienssen, 172.
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been alarmed at the invasion of Spain and Portugal by the
Wehrmacht, or that the neutral states, particularly Sweden
and Turkey, would have been panicked into action of one sort
or another.

Yet Hitler the politician felt that he could

not endanger his "system" of alliances nor burden Germany
with more fighting and occupation duties, especially as the
invasion of Russia demanded all of his country's efforts,
to say nothing of the previous preparations for the invasion
of Britain, the fighting in North Africa, and the war in the
Balkans.
These explanations, then, are theoretical in that
they never took place.

They are hot historical facts,

Spain was not invaded, and we will never know if the
Fuehrer's logic was correct.

But even if these explanations

are not historical facts they are realities, concrete expla
nations, in so far as they affected Hitler's thinking and
that of his military chiefs,

II

There are additional reasons, however, that if not
"simple," are less theoretical than the above.

These may

be stated as the Economy of Forces—the axiom of military
science that at any given time only so much can be done
with so many troops and so many guns in so many places.
In the West from June, 1940, until October, 1940, the

-139Wehrmacht was busily preparing for Ope ration Sea Lion, the
invasion of the British Isles.

This tremendous offensive

was to require all available strength and precluded the
\

engagement of forces in any other major campaign.

Besides,

if the British Isles were forced to surrender, Gibraltar
would most likely have become an automatic prize of war.
From October until June of the next year (1941),
after the cancellation of Operation Sea Lion, preparations
were in progress for the Eastern Offensive.

Hitler hoped

to find in Russia his badly needed "Battle of Decision,"
The combined German-Spanish action against Gibraltar (Opera
tion Felix) was to have taken place during this period.

It

was to have been a quick and a secondary engagement, invol
ving neither large numbers of troops nor much time.
Unfortunately, for the Germans, it was based on the concept
of Spanish co-operation, and was stillborn because that
6
co-operation was not forthcoming.

With the opening of the

It has been held by some writers (Ian Colvin, Chief
of Intellijgence; Karl Heinz Abshagen, Panaris; Anthony
Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals; Milton Shulman, Defeat
in the West) that Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Chief of the
German Military Intelligence (Abwehr). played a very great
role in keeping Spain out of the war and to a high degree
was responsible for the tempering of Nazi pressure on Spain
to assume a belligerent status and join the Axis war cause.
The career of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris is one of shadows,
for he was a secretive man who was simultaneously fighting
the Russian, British and American secret services, the
infringements on his organization by the Nazi Party
Intelligence Service (Sicherheitsdienst), and the Gestapo
who were interested in his alleged anti-Nazi and treasonable
activities. Some claim (lan Colvin for one) that he was an
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hold that he was a pessemistic man who merely had a weather
eye out for the future turn of events and the best he could
personally make out of them for no other than Wilhelm
Canaris. Paul Leverkuehn, author of German Military
Intelligence, was an immediate subordinate of Canaris in
the Abwehr. He holds that the Admiral had no knowledge
what-so-ever of illegal peace negotiations with the Allies
through his organization, nor did he become a willing
conspirator against Hitler's life and regime in what is
known as the 20 July plot. Gerald Reitlinger, in his work
The SS, Alibi of a Nation, maintains that Canaris was a good
friend of the mass-murderer, Reinhard Heydrich, and notes
that it was Canaris who gave the impassioned funeral oration
for Heydrich after his assassination by Czechoslovak partisans,
Canaris called Heydrich "his true friend and a great man."
(See Reitlinger p. 216; also Abshagen p. 149). Other writers,
C onstatine FitzGibbon for one
July) make Canaris out
as a loyal Christian and a decent fellow, if not an active
conspirator against the Nazi regime. Thus, the picture and
role of Wilhelm Canaris are shadowy, for he was a man skilled
in keeping in the shadows. But most writers agree that
Canaris did coach Franco before the Hendaye Conference, and
give the Caudillo an idea of what Hitler would demand and
how best to avoid those demands, yet keep the Fuehrer from
becoming too enraged. It appears that Canaris did much to
present the worst possible picture to the German High Command
of Spanish military ability and economic strength, thereby
+
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seems that Canaris* only interest in Spain; was to keep it
neutral, to prevent its being ravaged by the war. After the
Hendaye Conference, and especially after the opening of the
Eastern offensive, it appears that Canaris had little or no
interest in protecting Spain, for there was little danger
to the "^ungrateful" Sjpanish from the Germans. Rather,
according to most reports, Canaris was active in Spain before
the Hendaye Conference in an effort to keep Spain neutral.
This is an interesting line of investigation, but it is
outside the bounds of this thesis. Why Spain remained
neutral is another question, a question that cannot be
accurately answered until Madrid opens its archives. What is
of importance is that the Abwehr and Admiral Canaris had no
direct role in preventing a German invasion of Spain, although
it cannot be denied that his pessimistic reports on the
conditions in Spain must have had some indirect effect on the
later thinking of the Fuehrer and the Wehrmacht. To assess
that indirect effect is obviously impossible. The reports
by Canaris are included verbatim in Chapter I,

-141Balkan war during this period, and the invasion of Russia
immediately thereafter, the Wehrmacht was in no position
in terms of economy of forces to engage in a. costly
peninsular campaign.

On top of all this, there was the

African "holding action,"' a major campaign that the
Wehrmacht found impossible to supply with even minimum
necessities, such as fuel.

In the face of the weakening

economy of forces on the German side, an invasion of the
Iberian peninsula during the period 1940-42 was out of the
question.
By the end of 1942, as has been shown, the German
army had suffered through its first catastrophic winter in
Russia, had all but lost North Africa, and had suffered
tremendous defeats at sea and in the air.
"Battle of Decision" had been fought.

Yet no victorious

The Russians, the

British and the Americans were fighting with ever growing
strength.

The strength of the Wehrmacht was ebbing, and

it had grown weak. The Moloch of Stalingrad was soon to cost
the Wehrmacht 600,000 troops, and can be said to have been
one of the major turning points of the war.

It was the

highpoint of the Russian campaign, it was the "Battle of
Decision," and it ended in disaster.

After that awful

winter of 1942-43, Germany was never again to possess the
opportunity, let alone the ability, for the opening of a
new front.

It could not even hold those upon which it was
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forced to fight.

Desperate endeavors, such as the air-lift

of troops to Tunis in November, 1942, were rare exceptions.
That air-lift was the enervated gesture of a dying Afrika
Korps.

At any rate, the few thousand troops so painfully

gathered and air-lifted to Tunis could never have launched
an invasion of Spain through the Pyrenees, much less have
sustained it.
Hans Speidel, Rommel's Chief of Staff in Europe,
wrote in his work Invasion 1944;

"By the year 1943 Germany

had passed the peak of her military strength.

Disintegra

tion was spreading through her political leadership and her
military command."

7

Rommel himself wrote regarding Africa;

•*No longer could we carry the burden of three fronts."

8

He went on to point out that in 1944 the Russians had
broken through the lines to the east, and the Allies had
invaded the west.

In 1944 only the front in Italy was

holding, and that at tremendous costs in men and materiel,
Rommel wrote that only with great difficulty and by using
their last reserves had the Wehrmacht been able to impro
vise new lines, both east and west.
writings with that now famous phrase:

He then concluded his
"The sky over Germany

9
has grown very dark,"
T
Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944 (Chicagoj
1950), p. 3,
®Rommel, 524,
^Ibid,

Henry Regnery,

-143Thus it was that from June, 1940, until the end of
the war the Economy of Forces prohibited any movement by
the Wehrmacht into

Spain and Portugal.

There were simply

not enough men, guns, tracked vehicles, fuel stores, planes,
railway engines, naval craft, etc., to allow the German
military to open a new and what promised to be a very costly
front in an area that would in no event (according to
Hitler) give the needed "Battle of Decision."

As the

months passed, the supplies, the men, the materiels grew
ever shorter, and the war ever more terrible.
And then of course, there was the question of timing.
There never arose a lull, a period during which the invasion
could have been launched.

Operation Sea Lion, the build-up

for Operation Barbarossa, the Balkan war, the North African
campaign, the Italian defection, the partisan wars in
Yugoslavia, and so on, always prohibited any unnecessary
engagement.

The holocaust of the Eastern Front would have

in itself been enough to make the opening of another front,
especially in the West, insane.

But Hitler had much more

to deal with than the Eastern Front, and at no time was he
bothered with a surplus of troops or supplies during a
"slack period."

There were no slack periods!

The Economy of Forces may be judged the prime reason
for the failure of Hitler and the Wehrmacht to invade Spain
and Portugal.

One, of course, cannot disregard the other

factors which affected the problem and resulted in the
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decision not to launch an invasion.

But in terms of

material realities, and for the moment disregarding the
personal and political feelings of Hitler toward the Spanish,
the Economy of Forces still stands as the single great
explanation of the German decision not to invade, or what
is more, of Hitler's refusal to even consider such a thing.
Field Marshal von Manstein gave what is perhaps the best
!
precis of this factor;
The capture of Gibraltar could only have been
carried out with Spanish consent—which was in
fact never obtained—or by bringing pressure
to bear on the Spaniards. Either course would
have meant the end of Spanish neutrality. The
Reich would have been left with no other choice
than to take over—with or without the agreement
of Madrid and Lisbon—the protection of the whole
Iberian coastline,, as well as to guarantee the
supply of that area. Resistance could have been
expected from both countries—'most of all from
Portugal, who would have seen her colonies Immediatelv ocGunied bv Eneland. Anvhow. the Iberlam
peninsula would have swallowed a considerable
portion of the German Army in the long run, and
the repercussions in the U. S. A. and Latin
America to a forcible occupation of Spain and
Portugal could have been disastrous.
- -
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It is little wonder that Hitler looked aghast at an Iberian
war.
Who can say what the results would have been had he
done otherwise; had he not invaded the USSR but rather
followed the advice of Goering and Raeder in 1940"=41, had
he struck south and west through Spain and then across

^®Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories,
edited and translated by Anthony G. Powell (London; Methuen,
1958), p. 160-61.

145North Africa?

A great single campaign of lightning speed

which would have closed the Mediterranean at Gibraltar,
seized Suez from the weak British force there, and then
swept through the poorly defended Near East to link with
the Japanese somewhere in Afganistan or India.

The reflec

tions of Field Marshal Rommel would seem to be particularly
apt in this regard:
Victory in battle—save where it is brought
about by sheer weight of numbers, and omitting
all questions of the courage of the troops en~
gaged—never comes solely as the result of the
victor's planning. It is not only the merits
of the victor that decide the issue, but also
the mistakes on the part of the vanquished,

^^Rommel, 519
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military situations at various times and on various fronts.
But one must be very careful not to let the political feelings
and justifications of these soldiers color one's thought. The
same is true with Trevor-Roper°s Hitler's Secret Conversations
(Table Talks), This eolleetion of the table conversations of
the Fuehrer is of extreme value, but the reader must be
careful and try not to be misled by Hitler, Most of Hitler's
observations are accurate and were his genuine feelings, but
Hitler did not always mean what he said. Therefore, a careful
investigation of and comparison of dates and events with the
Fuehrer's statement sometimes brings out the true motive of
his statement, the real reasons behind his praise or his rage.
For general background in the period Wheeler-Bennett's
The Nemesis of Power, Craig's The Politics of the Prussian
Army and Fuller's The Second World War are excellent,
Churchill's voluminous work is full of interesting observa=>
tions, but tends to skip over the military aspect»
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Articles and Periodicals

Bock, Edwardo
"Spain and the Axis9"
March, 1942. Pp. 148-153.

Contemporary Review.

Bryants A. "Mr, Churchill's Recent Remarks on Spain,"
Illustrated London News„ June 17,, 1944, Pp. 666,
Mannesj M. "Lequerica; Interview With the New Foreign
Minister of Spain," Nation^ June 19, 1943. Pp. 514-515,
"Resume of the Cultural Agreement Between Germany and Nation
alist (insurgent) Spain," School and Society„ February 4,
1939, Pp. 150,
Although tinted toy the passion of war, Edward Bock's
article on Spain and the Axis offered an acute observation
of the pressures on and in Spain during the period. The
interview of Lequerica by Mannes, in Nation of 1943, served
as one of the best illustrations of the Spanish ability to
talk and say nothing. The interview is worthless as a source
for research, but remains an excellent example of what the
Spanish were saying and doing during the period, toward Axis
and Allies alike. Churchill's statement in the House of
Commons in 1944, quoted in the Illustrated London News» can
be taken as the official granting of pardon by the Allies to
Spain and General Franco for earlier "indiscretions," i.e.,
words and actions beneficial t-o the Axis=
The article in
School and Society concerning the German-Spanish Cultural
Agreement is of value because of the observations contained
in it and the penetrating deductions made regarding future
German-Spanish relations.

Unpublished Sources

Bengtson, John Robert, "Nazi War Aimss
the Plans for the
Thousand Year Reich," Unpublished Ph.D, disserta
tion, Department of History, State University of
Iowa, 1953, Pp. 284,
Haider, Generaloberst Franz. The Private War Journal of
Generaloberst Franz Haider (Chief of the General
Staff of the Supreme Command of the German Army,
1939-1942r~Released by the Off ice of the Chief
Historian, Headquarters European Command: United
States Army, 1950. Vols. I - VIII,

The dissertation by John Robert Bengtson proved to be
of inestimable valuec
Besides being a source for information
concerning German plans for the post-war period, it offered
explanations for German actions during the war, i.e., in
regard to the invasion of such areas as Greece and the USSR,
and the failure to invade the British Isles. The Haider
Diary, of course, can be called the primary source for this
thesis. If offered a larger and much more detailed insight
into the German military machine than any other source.
The chapters dealing with Economy of Forces, for example,
are based largely on the Haider War Journal. But it must
be mentioned that the events as recorded by Haider are not
always accurate. It cannot be denied that in matters of army
supply or battle tactics the Diary (War Journal) is correct,
but when Haider made note of grand strategy or the over-all
conduct of the war he at times tended to come out with the
wrong conclusions, mainly because Hitler was not a man to
tell his generals everything he was thinking or was planning
to do in the near or distant future»

